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ABSTRACT,
This experiment was designed to study the effect
of different channels of one-way communication on the
"behavior of subjects in a Prisoner’s Dilemma game, with
varying partner friendliness and subject trust.

This

was a 4x2x2 factorial design experiment, with four levels
of communication— face-to-face, television, telephone
and written— two levels of partner affect— friendly
and unfriendly— -and two trust levels, as measured by
the Rotter Interpersonal Trust Scale— high and low.
Each subject played against a preprogrammed set of commu
nications and responses sent to her by the experimenter,
who led her to believe that she was actually playing
against a real person.

Although no effects were attri

buted to the trust variable, it was found that (1) subject
in the face-to-face and television communication condi
tions cooperated significantly more than subjects in the
telephone communication condition: and (2) that subjects
playing a friendly confederate cooperated significantly
more than subjects playing this same unfriendly confe
derate.

However, both of these results seem due prima

rily to the low degree of cooperation when an unfriendly
confederate communicated by telephone.
iii
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INTRODUCTION
There is research evidence to indicate that the
average person spends about seventy percent of his active
hours communicating— listening, speaking, reading and
writing, in that order (Berio, I960).

Therefore, commu

nication is a variable extremely worthy of experimental
consideration.
The development in recent years of psychological
games has afforded an excellent opportunity for inves
tigators to study the hypothesized influence of communi
cation in interpersonal interactions.

The most common

two-person game used in this study has been the prisoner* s
dilemma (PD) game.

Appendix A, figure 1, presents the

prototype of the PD game.

The PD game induces, in a

restricted and well-defined context, the same kinds of
events that occur in the more complex social relations:
sometimes one person gains and the other loses, sometimes
both gain or lose simultaneously.

For example, using the

PD game in Appendix A, figure 2, two subjects are simul
taneously faced with the decision of choosing either
black or red..

The numbers in the cells represent the

potential gains for each player, the numbers on the
right indicating the outcomes to person

a

and the numbers

on the left denoting the outcomes to person B.
players choose black, then both gain.

If both

However, if one

chooses black and the other red, the latter gains more
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2
than if he had chosen black and the former gains less.
Finally, if both choose red, then both gain considerably
less than if they had both chosen black.

Therefore, the

PD game has been referred to as a mixed-motive game in
that, in it, the goals of the individuals are partially
in conflict and partially coincident with each other,
and the individuals involved must somehow resolve this
partial conflict of motives.

The mutual black strategy

represents the maximum long-term gain over successive
choices (cooperation) while the red strategy, although
granting maximum immediate gain, dooms the player to
lose in the long run (competition).
The PD game presents a situation that depends
on the two players trusting each other to select the
cooperative mutual long-term gain strategy, knowing that
an unreciprocated cooperative response is detrimental to
their own interests, and very profitable for the other
person.

In trust there is "...an implicit assumption

that one person will not deliberately hurt the other to
satisfy his own needs..." (Bennis et al., 1964, p. 223).
The PD literature abounds with studies which
indicate that this trust does not develop; in fact,
players adopt a competitive, short-term strategy which
restricts gains far below' those potentially available
(Rapoport, 1963).

However, in the typical PD game that

characterizes these studies, subjects were allowed no
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explicit communication avenues: they remained unaware
of the other1s intentions and could learn of the other
person's choice on the previous trial only at the end
of the trial when the experimenter announced the outcome
of that session.

This is insufficient to create a

cooperative relationship.

Bixenstine et al. (1963)

investigated the effects of such indirect communication
by programming one person's choice sequences; they found
that a very high percentage of unilateral cooperative
choices during the early trials was required to induce
a cooperative relationship between the subjects.

Since

the mere sequence of choice is inappropriate in inducing
two subjects to cooperate, perhaps permitting them to
communicate with each other before selecting a strategy
would allow then to commit themselves not to hurt each
other and would help establish an atmosphere of trust.
A number of investigators have introduced this
communication variable into PD research to see if commu
nication would increase trust and cooperation between
subjects.

A definition of interpersonal trust in the

communication process has been put forward by Giffin (1967)
as " a reliance upon the communication behavior of another
person in order to achieve a desired but uncertain
objective in a risky situation" (p. 105).

Therefore,

the opportunity to communicate should help subjects to
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arrive at a mutual understanding with respect to their
proposed game-behavior. As a result, assuming that
subjects are oriented toward gaining as much as possible,
as they should be, one would predict a significant
increase in cooperative responses.
Most studies using communication as an indepen
dent variable in PD research have indicated that commu
nication does increase cooperation between participants
(Bixenstine & Douglas, 1967; Bixenstine et al., 1966;
Deutsch, 1958, I960; Loomis, 1959; Terhune, 1968; Wallace
& Rothaus, 1969; Wichman, 1970).

However, these conclu

sions are laden with restrictions associated with the
specific circumstances of the experiment.

For example,

Deutsch (1958, I960) indicated that communication between
subjects engaged in a PD game facilitated cooperation
only when subjects were instructed to conc.ern themselves
with their own gains (individualistic orientation):
communication had no significant effect on cooperation
for subjects instructed to gain as much as possible for
themselves and for the other (cooperative orientation)
and for subjects instructed to beat the other as much
as possible (competitive orientation).

This observation

was further supported by Scodel et al. (1959) who noted
that the opportunity to communicate had no effect on the
strategies of the subjects -who had become entrenched in
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a competitive relationship.

Deutsch (1958) also noted

that any ameliorating effects of communication in a PD
game were a function of the number of minimum ingredients
of cooperative interchange— expectation, intention,
retaliation, absolution— contained in the message.
Loomis (1959) supported this notion that cooperation
increases as a function of the completeness of the
communication.
Most of the investigators who have studied
the effect of communication on trust and cooperation in
the PD game have limited their efforts to only a single
channel of communication: either written or spoken.
For example, Deutsch (1958) and Terhune (1968) allowed
their subjects to write notes to each other while Scodel
et al. (1959) and Bixenstine et al. (1966) permitted
communication on a face-to-face level.

This type of

research does not permit a comparison of the effect of
different channels of communication on the cooperative
behavior of subjects in a PD game.

The communication

channel, as an independent variable, has been an over
looked consideration in PD research; it may be an
important factor in determining the extent to which players
will be trusting enough to select the risky cooperative
strategy in the PD game.
Various communication channels may incorporate
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either one, or two, or all three modes of communication:
(a) linguistic, (b) paraiinguistic, and (c) visual.
The linguistic mode refers to the words that convey
the primary message.

The paraiinguistic mode refers to

the emphasis of certain words above others, the pattern
of intonation and timing, which provide nonverbal cues
that contribute to the meaning of the communication,
In addition to the linguistic and the paraiinguistic
modes of communication, visual modes such as facial
expressions and gestures provide nonverbal cues that
make up a background against which the communication is
displayed.

A written communication capitalizes only on

the linguistic mode of communication.

A telephone

communication would include the linguistic and para
iinguistic modes of communication.

Communication by

means of television or to a greater extent face-to-face
communication would incorporate all three modes of
communication.
What is required is a study in which communi
cation channels which include either one, or two, or all
three modes of communication are made available to
different subjects., and the results are compared across
experimental conditions.
Wichman (1970) has already provided some indi
cation that the effectiveness of a communication channel
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in allowing subjects to learn to cooperate in a PD game
may be a function of the number of communication modes
included in the channel.

In this study, cooperation was

shown to be significantly higher for subjects who could
see and speak to each other than for subjects who could
either only see or only speak to each other.

Wichman

expMined that combining different modes of communication
increases the efficiency of the communication channel so
that the subjects can provide the social contingencies
which allow them to cooperate with each other.
However, another study conducted for the British
government, investigating information transmission for
face-to-face and telephone communication, found no
significant differences between the conditions (Commu
nications Studies Group, 1970).
Following these leads, this study was undertaken
to develop experimental evidence as to the influence of
four communication channels— written, telephone, tele
vision and face-to-face--on the behavior of subjects
in a PD game.

It was hypothesized that results would

show an increasing amount of cooperation from the
written communication condition (mode a), to the telephone
communication condition (mode a, b), to the television
and face-to-face communication conditions (mode a, b, c).
Since every prisoner's dilemma situation is an
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interpersonal situation characterized by relatively
continuous affective interchanges among participants,
affect was another dimention worth considering in this
context.

Since Davitz (1964) and Hunt and Lin (1967)

have already indicated that subjects can reliably judge
a communicator's feelings or attitudes on the basis of
that person's communication, the quality of affect
between players can be manipulated by enlisting the
support of a confederate to present himself as either a
warm, friendly person or a cold, hostile person.

It

was hypothesized, in this experiment, that subjects
interacting with a friendly person would react more
favorably toward that person and, as a result, would
play more cooperatively than subjects interacting with
a hostile person.
A third variable considered in this study consisted
in Rotter's Interpersonal Trust Scale (Rotter, 1967).
This scale is based on the notion that people differ
in the extent to which they believe that the promised
negative or positive reinforcemtnts will occur when
promised by other people; such expectancies would probably
generalize from one communicator to another (Rotter,
1967).

Prom these assumptions, Rotter constructed

his Interpersonal Trust Scale to measure a person's
generalized expectancy that the promises of other indi
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viduals with regard to future "behavior can "be relied
upon (Rotter, 1967).
An adequate measure of interpersonal trust would
he extremely valuable in research such as this one,
which involves the communication of information.

A

number of investigators have indicated that people who
trust others are also more trustworthy, or cooperative
(Deutsch, 1958, I960; Loomis, 1959).

Therefore, with

regards to the present study, it was hypothesised that
subjects who scored high on the Rotter Interpersonal
Trust Scale would cooperate more than those who scored
low on the scale.
In summary, therefore, this study was designed
to investigate cooperation in a PD game as a function
of (1) communication channel, (2) friendliness of
opponent and (3) trust of subject as measured by the
Rotter Interpersonal Trust Scale.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

METHOD
Subjects
Subjects for this experiment were 54 female
undergraduate students enrolled in introductory psychology
at the University of 7/indsor during the 1970-71 winter
session.

The experimenter distributed approximately

250 questionnaires (see Materials) to males and females
in introductory psychology.

They were able to indicate

their desire to participate in the experiment on the
questionnaire.

During recruitment, no mention was made

as to the precise nature of the study except that the
subjects would be interacting with another person in
the experiment.

Subjects were also informed that the

experiment would take forty-five minutes of their time
and that they would earn money as a result of their
participating.

The questionnaires of the seventy

females who indicated a desire to participate were
scored and the subjects were contacted by telephone.
Payment of Subjects
Subjects were paid in accordance to their accu
mulated outcomes over the twenty-trial experiment,
Subjects received payment immediately after the experi
ment .
Materials
The payoff matrix was presented as shown in
Appendix B.

One subject (the "I choose" subject)
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indicated her choice of alternatives by placing a marker
on either one of the two solid colored circles, while
the other subject (the "Other chooses" subject) indicated
her choice by placing her marker on either one of the two
striped colored circles.

This was the same matrix

used by Scodel et al. (1959) and by Wichman (1970).
This matrix has a low "cooperative index", a term used
by Terhune (1968) to refer to the ratio (X^-X^J/tXyXg) >
which relates positively to cooperation tendency (Rapoport & Chammah, 1965).

Therefore, with this matrix

which has a low cooperative index, the tendency to
cooperate is low because a subject is highly rewarded
for choosing the non-cooperative strategy.
During the recruitment period, the experimenter
administered to several classes of introductory psycho
logy students the Rotter Interpersonal Trust Scale
(Rotter, 1967) (see Appendix C).
At the end of the experiment, subjects completed
three sets of semantic differential rating scales— one
set to rate the other person, another to rate the experi
ment itself, and finally another to rate the messages
(see Appendix D).

The paired opposites of the first

set were selected on the basis of their mention in a
review of the attitude change literature (Lindzey &
Aronson. 1968).

For the "Other Person" and "Experiment"
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rating scales, a table of random numbers was used to
determine the order in which the pairs were to be presented.
In addition, since the original item pairs had been
designed in such a way that the first adjective carried
positive connotations and the second negative connota
tions, the table of random numbers was used to reverse
half of the item pairs.

The "Message" rating scale

was constructed on the basis of Deutsch1s (1958) four
ingredients of a cooperative interchange:

intention,

expectation, retaliation, and absolution.
Instructions regarding the game and the experi
ment were held constant by presenting them to the subjects
by means of a tape recorder.

Instructions specific to

each communication condition were included at the end
of each tape.
For the television communication condition, a
television monitor was provided so that subjects could
view the communicator.

The subjects in the telephone

communication condition were given access to a telephone
through which they could hear the communications.

For

the written communication condition, notes were provided
to the subjects.
Design
This experiment was a 4x2x2 factorial design,
with manipulations of four communication dimensions—
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face-to-face, television, telephone, and written— -two
affective conditions— friendly and unfriendly— and two
levels of interpersonal trust— high and low.

Three

subjects were assigned to each of the sixteen cells of
this design.
In addition, a control group consisting of
three high-trust and three low-trust subjects was run
in which no explicit communication was allowed.

This

condition served as a base line against which to compare
the other four communication conditions.
Subjects were assigned to the two trust groups
on the basis of their scores on the Rotter Interpersonal
Trust Scale.

These scores ranged from 44 to 94.

Subjects

scoring from 44 to 65 were delegated to the low-trust
condition while those scoring from 68 to 94 were delegated
to the high-trust condition.
The content of the communications was held
constant by preparing the communications in advance.
Care was taken to insure that the communications contained
the four minimum ingredients of a cooperative interchange:
intention, expectation, retaliation and absolution
(Deutsch, 1958).

In addition, the principle of imme

diacy (Weiner & Mehrabian, 1968) was used in preparing
the friendly and unfriendly communications.

Immediacy

refers to the different degrees of separation between
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the speaker and the object she communicates about or the
addressee of her communication.

For example, "we should

choose black" is more immediate than "you and I should
choose black", which explicitly maintains separation
between the communicator and the receiver: therefore, the
first would make up a friendly communication, whereas
the second an unfriendly communication.

A further indi

cation of hostility would be, "I shall choose black and
so should you"* here the separation is intensified by
the very fact that "I" and "you" are farther apart in the
sentence and also by the fact that the communicator puts
selective egocentric emphasis on herself to the exclusion
of the other person.
The messages were scheduled to take place at
the beginning of the practice sessions, then immediately
before the first trial of the game and finally at the end
of the middle trial of the twenty-trial game.

They

were presented by a confederate (referred to in the experi
ment as Person B ) .

For the face-to-face condition, the

confederate participated in the experiment and presented
the communications in person.

For the television commu

nication condition, the prepared statements were video
tape recorded and presented to the subjects during the
experiment.

For the telephone condition, tape recordings

were simultaneously taken with the videotapes and were

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

15
played through a telephone system.

For the written

communication condition, the same prepared statements
were written and the message passed to the subjects.
As a result of this pre-recording procedure, the experi
menter was able to run these three latter experimental
communication conditions without the confederate's
actually being present.
As a result of the standardized communications,
the game-playing behavior of the confederate during the
experiment was also predetermined.

Consistent with the

content of the communications, the investigator programmed
the confederate to start with a cooperative response
and to match on each trial the subject's previous response.
Since Deutsch (1958) noted that communication
effects are observed only when subjects are given an indi
vidualistic orientation, the instructions included a
section designed to produce an individualistic set in
the subjects.

They were told that the point of the

experiment was to earn as much as they could for them
selves, and not to be concerned about what happened to
the other person,

within this individualistic orientation,

the subjects were free to decide whether they could win
more by cooperating or by competing with the other person.
To further promote this individualistic set, the experi
menter gave the subjects feedback regarding only their own
cumulative outcome.

This prevented the subjects from
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comparing their progress with that of the other person,
which is one aspect of the PD situation which promotes
a competitive atmosphere.

In addition, the instructions

were made deliberately neutral, using no terms suggesting
cooperation, conflict or competition.
were told simply:

The subjects

"...you and person B stand a chance

of earning money today, but how much you gain will depend
on what you do and what the other person does."
Procedure
The experimenter escorted the subject into a
room and seated her at a desk, adjacent to a one-way
mirror, on which were an identification letter (A),
a wooden block and the PD matrix (see Appendix B).

A

television monitor or a telephone were also on the desk
for the television or the telephone communication
conditions.

The experimenter explained that the other

subject was in a second room and that during the experiment
the investigator would station himself in the adjacent
observation room from which he could view both subjects
through a one-way glass.

The experimenter then withdrew

to the observation room and turned on the tape recorded
instructions of the experiment and explanation of the PD
game (see Appendix E).

At one point during the tape,

the experimenter stopped the tape: he entered the experi
mental room and gave the subject practice so that all
payoff contingencies were illustrated.

After the subject
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had demonstrated her ability to state the outcome for all
four payoff contingencies, the experimenter returned to
the observation room and played the remaining portion of
the instructions.

When the instructions had finished,

the experimenter signalled by means of an intercom the
beginning of the experiment, indicating to the subject
that the first few trials would be practice trials to
familiarize them with the experimental procedure and would
not count toward their earnings.
Face-to-face communication.
announced the first communication.

The experimenter
After a minute

31preparation interval" where the subject was led to
believe that the other subject was preparing her commu
nication, the experimenter directed the confederate
into the experimental room and withdrew.

The confe

derate seated herself before the subject and performed
the first prepared communication (see Appendix F, part 1)
in either a friendly or an unfriendly fashion, depending
on the particular affect condition.

Then the confederate

left the experimental room and, after a short pause, the
experimenter informed the subjects (that is, the real
subject and the confederate) to make their first practice
choice.

The subject indicated her choice by placing

a block on either the solid black circle or the solid
red circle.

After she had placed her block, the experi-
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menter announced both her outcome and the the confede
rate 's outcome, contingent upon her choice and the pre
determined confederate cooperative response:
gets ___; person B gets

__".

A's cumulative outcome:

"Person A now has

"Person A

Then he announced person
cents".

After a short pause during which the subject was led to
believe that the experimenter was giving person B her
cumulative outcome, the experimenter informed the subjects
to remove their blocks.

After five such trials, during

which the experimenter programmed the confederate's
response according to the subject's previous response,
the experimenter indicated that the real experiment was
about to begin.

Then he announced the second communi

cation and asked the subject to give the other person
a few moments to prepare her communication.

He then

directed the confederate into the experimental room
for the second prepared communication (Appendix P,
part 2) and withdrew: again, the confederate presented
either the friendly or the unfriendly communication,
consistent with how she had presented the first commu
nication.

When the confederate had left the experimental

room after the communication, the experimenter informed
the subjects to make their first game choice.

The

experimenter announced the outcome of that trial in terms
of the confederate's predetermined cooperative response
and the subject's choice.

The succeeding trials were

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

19
played according to the predetermined contingency set
up for the confederate.

Feedback again was provided on

a single trial basis and cumulatively over trials.

At

the end of the tenth trial, the experimenter announced
the third communication and, after a minute pause, directed
the confederate into the experimental room once again.
After this final communication, which was selected from
a pool of four versions according to the preceding behavior
of the subject, (Appendix F, part 3a, b, c and d) the
confederate withdrew and the experimenter continued the
experiment for ten more trials as before.

Then the experi

menter entered the experimental room with a cops^ of the
semantic differential rating scales and instructed the
subject to give her candid impressions of the other person,
of the experiment and of the messages.

Then the experi

menter withdrew into the observation room.

When the subject

had completed the scale, the experimenter entered the
experimental room, and debriefed the subjects as to the
nature of the experiment.

Then he invited the subject to ask

any questions pertaining to the experiment, which he
answered frankly.

The experimenter then payed the subject

in accordance to her accumulated outcomes and dismissed
her, asking her not to reveal the purpose and nature of the
experiment.
Television communication,

The experimenter
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followed the same procedure as above: except in these
conditions, he played the pre-recorded videotapes
through the television monitor to communicate the three
messages.
Telephone communication.

The experimenter

adhered to the same procedure with the exception that
the three messages were transmitted via a telephone
system.
Written communication. Again the same proce
dure was followed except that the three communications
were presented by means of written messages.

Consistent

with real life situations, subjects in this condition
retained the notes and could refer to them at any time
in the course of the experiment.
No communication.

No explicit communication

was allowed in this condition.

As a result, the subjects

were not required to rate the messages at the end of the
experiment.
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RESULTS,
This section deals first with a description of
the dependent measures in this experiment and then
with analyses carried out on the performance measures
and on the post-experimental ratings.
Dependent Measures
Game performance in this experiment was measured
by means of choices and cents payoff,

for the choice

performance measures, the practice session included five
choices while the game sessions included twenty choices;
data analyses were performed on these measures by scoring
black choices (cooperative choices) 1 and red choices
(competitive choices) 0.

The payoff data consisted of

the subjects' hypothetical earnings over the practice
trials and of their actual "take-home" earnings over
the twenty experimental trials.
When the choice and payoff performance measures
were correlated over all twanty-five trials, a very high
correlation of .97 between the two measures resulted.
However, when the twenty-five trials were broken down
into one five-trial practice block and two ten-trial
experimental blocks, this correlation dropped to a

v e ry

low .61 for the practice block, rose to .93 for experi
mental block 1 and declined again to .85 for experimental
block 2.

These lower correlations within blocks justify

treating the choice and payoff performance measures as
two separate dependent variables in this study.
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For each of these choice and payoff dependent
variables, a correlation was computed between performance
in the practice session and subsequent performance in
the game.

Although, as seen in Table 1, there appears

to be some relationship between practice performance and
game performance for both dependent measures, the corre
lation between the two performances was only a moderate
.59 for the choice measure and a relatively low .25 for
the payoff measure.

This supports our initial assumption

that the practice trials only allowed the subjects to
familiarize themselves with the game and with the
experimental procedure: therefore, these practice data
were omitted from most of the data analyses.
Comparison between Conditions on Choice and Payoff
Performance Measures
Comparison between controls and experiiaentals
Table 2 presents multivariate analyses of variance showing
the differential effects of conditions on mean choices
and mean payoffs for the friendly and unfriendly expe
rimental and control conditions over twenty game trials.
The conditions variable consisted of a comparison
between the control condition and each of the eight
communication-by-affeet conditions.

With regards to the

conditions variable, these analyses yielded significant
differences between the control condition and each experi-

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

23
TABLE 1

Percent cooperative choices and mean payoffs on the twenty experimental
trials as s t function of the number of cooperative choices on the five
practice trials

Number of
cooperative
choices on
practice
trials

R

Rone a

1

One

3

Percent cooperative choices j
!5 practice
; trials

0
:

20

Mean Payoff

| 20 experimental | 5 practice f 20 experiments]
j
trials
] trials \
trials
I
*
.1
. ..
1
y
1
I
100.0
f
I
60.0
9.0
5
I
j
37.7
i
3i.6
j 12.0

5
Two

11

40

!

4 7 .3

|

12.5

44.4

Three

12

60

1

74.2

|
|

14.8

52.8

Pour

6

80

j

79.2

15.0

54.0

Five

21

100

!

93-x

15.0

58.7

f

|

a Note that this represents only one case where the subject competed
during the practice trials but cooperated during the experimental
trials.
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TABLE 2

Multivariate and univariate analyses of variance on choice and

Comparison of
Controls with

payoff performar

Multivariate Analysis of Variance
Choice and
Friendly

Unfriendly

Frier

Eace-to-face
16.05

Conditions (C)

| <.005|14.18

< .005

| 1,10 (32.51

j

Blochs (B)

} 1,10 ] 0.00

j

C x B

! 1,10 | 4.12

j

Television
Conditions (C)

2,9

20.18

< .0 0 1 1 6.80

^.025

f 1,10 I 33.65

Blocks (B)

| 1,10 j 0.43

C x B

I 1,10 j .6,16
i

Telephone
Conditions (C)

2,9

12.02

\

<..005! 1.18

ns

Blocks (B)
C x B

1.10 J25.25
1.10 j _0.27

1.10j 3.58

l

Written
Conditions (C)

2,Q

6.11

j ^ .025

7.98

<.01

Blocks (B)
C x B
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.10 j13.11

10
>10

|4.10
0.66
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payoff performance measures of controls and experimentals for twenty game trials

Univariate Analyses of Variance
Payoff
Choice
"Unfriendly
TJhirTendTy*
■priendTy
T?riendXy
p
P
p
P
p

df
f:
I
s

f

< 0.84
1-1 *50

.001
ns
ns

22.95
2.60
16.76

.001 14.04
ns
j 0.29
i C .05
1.80

< .005
ns
ns

21.44
1.57
5.53

1 1,10 [32, 51
1,10 | 0, 00
i i»io 1 4, 12
f

<

]

! 1,10 f 33. 65
43
16

10

<

.001
ns

.10

J31.01

.001
ns

24.47
2.98

<

< .005

10.47

<

<

.001 |14.98
ns | 3.22
i

< .05

.001
ns
.01

< .005
ns

113.77

<.005

3

I 1:10 |25. 25
'

\

27
3 56

i

!

<10

J

* .005 j 11.85
5.61 (
^.01
ns j lv 93
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•

13.31
10.53
1.63

|
j

—1

< .005
ns
ns

ns
.ns
ns

1

|°'35

i
i

j

O

<.005 Il6.02
I ^.10
{
ns
! 2.17
{

05

< .005 ! 2.08
S 19.18 !
?
£
4
2.65
j 4.09 a
i
.01 ii 1.57
j 11.91 A
i
s

V

11-10 j13. 11
|1.10 | 4, 10
jiao | o, 66

j

ns
ns

| 2.53
j 0.00
J'5.90
t
I

O
H
7

! 1 -10
I1,10

| <.001
I ns

<.05
ns
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mental condition, except the telephone-unfriendly condi
tion.
In order to isolate the sources of these signi
ficant differences, separate univariate analyses, comparing
the controls with each experimental condition, were
performed on the choice and payoff data.

For these

univariate analyses, it was possible to include withinsubject blocks effects for the first ten and the last
ten trials.

Again, Table 2 points out the striking finding

that, with the important exception of the telephoneunfriendly condition, during the game, the subjects in
all communication conditions performed significantly
more cooperatively and earned significantly greater payoffs
than the control subjects.

Table 3, which summarizes the

mean score on both performence measures for each condition,
confirms the analysis of Table 2.
The preponderance of cooperation among communi
cation conditions was further accentuated by three facts.
First, as shown in Table 3, the experimentals on the whole
chose the black cooperative strategy a mean of 16.04
times during the game, while the controls chose black only
6.17 times.

Similarly, experimental subjects received

an average of 54-6 cents as compared to the 38.17 cents
earned by the controls.

These differences were significant

both for choices (F:=;28.93, df = l;53? P<-.001) and payoffs
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TABLE 3

Lean cooperative clioiees and mean payoff for control and commtuaication aonditioi

Mean cooperative choices
ommuni cation!
ondition
j
jFriendfyjh Unfriendly N jCombined
i
s—
^— -i—
1
ace-to-face j 17.17j6 17.83 ;6 | 17.50
6 j 16.92
elevision
I 18.00 |6
15.83
10.50 j6 \j 13.92
elephone
\ 17.33 |6
ritten
\ 16.50 !6
15.17 I6 I 15.84
ombined
1
17.25 lia 14.83 [i;| 16.04
\
!
s \
j
o communi- \
cation |
I
6.17
) 3
t
&
j
j |
!
t

Mean payoff in cents
j
1
N |Friend]y|N 'Unfriendly
Combined N..
5-|
'i
i ;
1
(
12; 57.33 ;6 j 57.50
6| 57.42 12
12| 56.83 16 | 55.33
6 i 56.08 12
6 f 50.75 !12
12! 56.33 [6 | 45.17
12: 55.33 |6 1 53.00
i 'i
6! 54.17 12
I2f 54.60 |24
24i 56.46 il2f 52.75
j
I
(
i i
6 I
1 38.17 |6
f
I
i!
f
s
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( F ~ 32.05, df-1, 53, P < .001).

Second, 37 percent of

the experimental subjects chose nothing but the cooperative
black strategy all the way through the experiment; none
consistently chose red.

In contrast, none of the control

subjects consistently cooperated, but one control chose
the red competitive strategy all the way through.
Third, 62.5 percent of the experimental exhibited a
cooperative lockin, that is, cooperation on at least
nine of the final ten trials (Rapoport & Chammah, 1965;
Wichman, 1970), whereas none of the controls did.

In

contrast, 33.3 percent of the controls exhibited a
competitive lockin, that is, competition on at least
nine of the final ten trials, whereas no experimental
subject locked in a competitive strategy.
Comparison between four communication, two affect
and two trust levels.

Table 4 presents a multivariate

analysis of variance showing the effect of four levels
of communication, two levels of affect and two levels of
trust upon mean choices and mean outcomes for twenty
game trials.

This analysis yielded significant differences

between communication conditions (F r2.31, df - 6,62 E< .05)
and between affect conditions (F= 2,83, df-2,31, P ^ .10)
which may be attributed to the significant interaction
between communication and affect ( F - 2.31, d f — 6,62,
P <-.05).

ho effects of trust were noted and this variable
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TABiiE 4

Multivariate and univariate analyses of variance on choice and payoff
performance measures for twenty game trials
----------------------------------------... - -----

;----------------------------------------5-----------------------------------

Source of
f
Multivariate
§
Variance
I Choices and Payoffs I
----------- -----— "jf :•
f~
— ~r~
62 i
)

2 .31

| 2. 31 j
I
t
* 2 31 f
:
j
,
\
—

2 .83

Communication. (C )
1
Affect(A)
Trust(T)
Blocks(B)
C

X

A

C X T
A

X

T

C X B

6’

1
It
Ik

1 6, 62 >
J
.
'
62
\ 6’
,
(
1 2, 31 i-.
|
f.

A

X

B

T X B
C
C
n

U

X
X

A x T

i
!

62
6>

i

.10 a ,32
ns jl,32

i

2 .31

I
•
j

0 .72

1
1..30 5
J
s
$
t

J
I
9
4
14 i
1

I

;
.05 i3 ?32

0 .56

V

1 .

5

|5
1

A x B

Univariate
Choices

•
—

I1 ’32

.05 j3,32
ns j3,32
ns U . s
—

.

3,32

—

[1.32

—

i1,32

- -

I

—

i\

!■

iZHZJZZZTnZ
1

1

i

ns |3,32j 3.51 ? .05
I 2-11 1
5
i
5
1.32
3 5.75 I ,05
.05
I 4 *97 f
t
1
i
1
3
j 0.02 j ns 11,32] 0.02 I ns
j
i
{ 6.18 j.02|^ 3 2 i 0.52 | ns
j 2.70 | .10
1 2.14 [
s ns |3,32
>
3
s
1
ns
0.98
1
ns
| 0.84 i
(3,32 j
"
i
j 0.38 ! ns ;i,32j
0.99 1 ns
<
}
|
j 0.86 ! ns b»32 f 1.32 | ns
j
'
»
5
i
j 0,19 ? ns ] 1 , 3 2 \ 0.07 ! ns
i
j 0.09 1 ns M
2 j 0.01 | ns
s.

ns 13,32
.—

!3,32

t

X T x B

■i

| Univariate
1
Payoffs

—

3,32

1 2.34 |-10 |3,32.j 2.38 1 .10
j
ns |3,32j 0.18
ns
\ 1.09 j
j
;
ns
jr 0.64 ] ns ;3 ,32 j 0.22
■

:

A

X

T x B

- -

C

X

A x T x B

- -

—

1

—

1,32

j 0.77 ) ns *1,32 | 1.21

—

3,32

j

1.27 | ns 3,32 I 0.72
1
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will be omitted from further analyses of choices and
payoffs.
In order to isolate the sources of the significant
differences obtained from the multivariate analysis,
separate univariate analyses were performed on choices
and payoffs.

Again, it was possible to include within-

subject blocks effects for the first ten and the last
ten trials in these univariate analyses.
Table 4 suggests that the significant communi
cation effect noted in the multivariate analysis may be
attributed more to payoff scores than to the choice
measures.

When the payoff means for the four experi

mental conditions were subjected to Duncan’s Multiple
Range test, the mean payoff of 50.75 cents to subjects
in the telephone condition was found significantly lower
than the 57-42 cents of subjects in the face-to-face and
the 56.08 cents of subjects in the television communication
conditions (!P<.05); subjects in the written condition
earned a mean of 54.17 cents, which was not significantly
different from any other mean.
in Table 3*

These data are presented

However, these results must be interpreted

in light of the communication-by-affect interaction
observed in Table 4 for the payoff measure.

When the

mean payoffs of the eight various communication-by-affect
conditions were subjected to Duncan's Multiple Range
test, the mean payoff of 45.17 cents to subjects in the
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telephone-unfriendly condition was found to be signifi
cantly lower than the mean payoffs of each other commu
nication condition which, as seen from Table 3, ranged
from 53.00 cents to 57.50 cents; these differences were
significant at the 1 percent level for all the communi
cation conditions, except for the written-friendly,
written-unfriendly and telephone-unfriendly conditions
where the difference was significant at the 5 percent
level,

ho other significant differences emerged from

the Duncan test.
Although no communication or communication-byaffect effects were noted for the choice performance
measure in Table 4, these approached significance at the
10 percent level: therefore, as for the payoff means, the
choice means for the four communication conditions were
compared by means of Duncan's Multiple Range test.
Similarly, this test showed that the 13-9 cooperative
choices of the subjects in the telephone condition was
significantly lower than the 17.5 of subjects in the
face-to-face and the 16.9 of subjects in the television
conditions (p<.05): subjects in the written condition
played a mean of 15.84 cooperative choices, which was
not significantly different from any other mean.
these data are presented in Table 3-

Again,

And again, since

the communication-by-affect interaction for choices
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approached significance at the 10 percent level, another
Duncan Multiple Range test was performed on the mean
cooperative choices of the eight communication-by-affect
conditions.

As in the equivalent Duncan test performed

on payoffs, the subjects in the telephone-unfriendly
condition chose a mere 10.5 black cooperative choices,
compared to the other experimental conditions which
exhibited from 15.17 to 18.00 black choices, as seen from
Table 3: these differences were significant at the 1
percent level for all communication conditions, except
for the written-unfriendly condition where the difference
was significant at the 5 percent level.
Table 4 also shows that there was a significant
difference between the friendly and unfriendly conditions
for both choice and payoff performance measures (P-c.05).
Referring back to Table 3, subjects interacting with a
friendly confederate chose a mean of 17.25 black choices
during the game while those interacting with a hostile
confederate chose a mean of 14*83 black choices.
Similarly, subjects in the friendly condition earned a
mean of 56.46 cents as compared to the 52.75 cents
earned by those in the unfriendly condition.

Again these

differences must be interpreted in light of the communication-by-affect interaction.

Friendly choices and payoffs

exceeded unfriendly in each communication condition,
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except for the face-to-face condition which saw a slight
increase in cooperative choices and payoffs in the unfriendly
condition as compared to the friendly condition.

However,

as noted in the two previous Duncan tests performed on
the eight communication-by-affect conditions, it was in the
telephone condition that subjects in the unfriendly condi
tion made significantly fewer cooperative responses and
earned substantially lower payoffs than their counterparts
in the friendly condition (Pc .01).
Blocks effects.

Finally, as mentioned previously,

the twenty game trials were broken down into two blocks of
ten trials each in order to present some picture of the
trends in cooperation and payoffs from the first to the
second half of the game.
Tables 2 and 4 both included blocks effects in
their analyses.

Because this measure is a within-subject

variable, it C/ould not be subjected to a multivariate
analysis of variance.

However, when blocks were included

in the univariate analyses performed on choices and payoffs,
a number of significant results appeared.
First, Table 2, which presents the comparison
between the controls and each of the communication-byaffect conditions for twenty game trials, reveals signi
ficant communication-by-block interactions for the analysis
including the controls and all the friendly communication
conditions except the written condition for both choices and
payoffs.

These interactions are also significant in the
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unfriendly condition for the telephone communication
(choices only) and the face-to-face and television condi
tions (Payoffs only).

In each interaction the performance

measure rose from the first to the second block forrthe
communication condition while it fell for the control
condition.

Note that only in the written communication

condition was there not a sufficient increase in perfor
mance from the first to the second block to result in a
communication-by-blocks interaction.
Bote also from Table 2 the significant main blocks
effects for choices in the^friendly condition and for
both choices and payoffs in the -unfriendly condition.
When blocks were included in the univariate analyses
performed for the various communication conditions on
choices and payoffs for the twenty game trials (see Table 4),
a significant blocks effect appeared for the choice perfor
mance measure (F-6.18, df~l,32, Pc .025); the mean
number of cooperative choices increased from 7.67 in the
first half of the game to 8.38 in the second half.
Following this lead, all twenty-five trials,
including the practice trials, were broken down further
into blocks of five in order to study the short- and long
term effects of each communication on cooperative choices
and payoffs.

Table 5 summarizes these data which are

illustrated in Figures 1 and 2 for choices and payoffs
respectively: the control curve has been included in these
graphs for comparison purposes.
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TABLE 5

Summary of percent cooperative choices and mean payoffs over five fivetrial blocks for communication and control conditions

Communication
Condition

Overall :a
face-to-face
Television

Percent cooperative choices |
Mean Mock payoffs
BlbckBBIock}Mocm;Block .bibcklBIoek* Block. Slock;block Block"
1
2 ''3:4: 5
1
2
3
4
5

87
72

! 83
| 85

64
73
“74

j 80
i "80

friendly:
face-to-face
Television
Telephone
Written
Mean

83
73
80
63
75

f
1
1
1
j

I 72

80
90
93.
87
88

j 95
J 90
I 78
j 82

j*74

86

j 80
70

} 90
1100
j 90
j 80
j
1 90

73
83
77

87 ;14.67 !14.33 *13 •65 114.68 1 4 .74
I
*
‘
1
I
92 [13.76 ]14.16|13.26 (13.43 115.25
i 70 |l4.00113.66111.60 513.00 ?12.50
i 77 ji4 .6Oji4 .i5 j.i3.6O 12.93 ;13.50
; 82 114.25 14.08 13.02 jl3.5l <14.00
I

[14 -50 ;14 .15 i!3 .65
113.67 14 .17 :i3 .67
115 .35 ;i5 .17 •12 .50
:!3 .85 |14 .15 ■14 .35
13 .54
:
■ 91 ;!4 •34 j14

14 35 15 15
14 .00 15 .00
15 .00 13 .65
12 .85 514 .00
14 05 114 .45

80 14 .83
: 83 ,13 .85
50 12 .65
: 73 15 -35
72 J 1 4 .17

13 65
12 85
10 .70
12 85
12 .51

15 .00 m •33
12 .85 U5 •50
11 .00 in .35
13 .00 ii3 .00
12 .96 jlj .55
£

.17 11 .00 10 00

8 .50 1 9 .00

93
? 100
j 90
1 80

1
—1
•

Telephone
Written
Mean

1 85
i 72
j 58
{ 78

I

•
j

b
Unfriendly:
face-to-face
Television
Telephone
Written
Mean
Control

a N

b

90
70

j 87
1 80

47
83
73

; 50
! 73
| 72

43

! 37
1

90

j100
\ 80

73
43 ! 67
73 I S3
70 j 82

i

37

33
17

14 .50
14 .15
12 .15
14 .15
13 .74

i13

-12
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Multivariate analyses, comparing controls with
experimentals for each of the five blocks (see fable 6)
show significant differences for all conditions in Blocks
2 and 4, immediately after the second and third communica
tions, except for the telephone-unfriendly condition.
These differences were maintained in Block 5, again
except for the telephone-unfriendly condition.
Evidently, communication has a marked effect on
choices,

figures 1(a), (b) and (c)— for combined friendly

and unfriendly conditions, friendly conditions and un
friendly conditions, respectively— show first that for each
communication condition, regardless of channel, the origi
nal pre-practice communication produces a higher level of
cooperative choices in Block 1 (practice), as compared to
the control condition.

This difference is significant for

each experimental condition, with the exception of the
television-unfriendly, telephone-unfriendly and writtenfriendly conditions: this can be seen in Table 6.
Univariate analyses of variance on the five-trial
block data for the communication conditions yielded signi
ficant blocks effects for choices (F =-3.88, df-4, 128,
Pk.01).

Thus, as seen in Figures 1(a), (b) and (c), the

pattern over the remainder of the game for the experimental
conditions is as follows.

After the second communication,

cooperation increased still further in Block 2, but fell
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TABLE 6
altivariate and univariate analyses of variance on choice and payoff p
measures of controls and experimentals for five blocks of five trial

U n i v a r i a

__ ...."""ltd
Jj|' df
* 5

p

A n a l y s

Choice

;

j

i

te

j Block 2
1 P
F
] P i
i—F — <
..
■-■■■—»j
■
i
i
i
j
V
1
Block 1

j Block 3
|f

!

Block 4

| p j F

' Block 5
P fF
1 P
1
..... .
i......
i
I
}

>
| .005
i

i
i
i]
i
!! i, 10 ! 10.29 | .01 113-00
{
i
c

I .001

•i m "J-0

4.76 1 .10 j14.88 \ .005 (2.58 ( ns 107.76 !.001 [35.71 3 .001

.01

)1,10

9.31 I .025123.69

.005

j
1
I
5.67 I.05 1 36,69
i
1

4001 (25.31
1
i
t .001

001 |3.57 ).10 I 48.40 ].001{18.77 \ .005

.OH

1,10

.01

1,10

11.40

.01

.00'

,10

2.62

ns

9.49 j .025 13.57 I .10. 17.87 [ .005(13.24 ! .005

nr

.10

0.05

ns

0.73 1 ns

.1C

.10

10.29

.01

1.26 I ns

15.41

,005

6.3 6

,05 I17.87 ? .005 ! 7.00 | .025

13.24

.005

8.76

.025107.76 I .001? 7.66 I .025

10.12

ns

8.29 i .025 13.85

.10

8.46 | .025| 0.68 j ns
34.48

.001

7.20 1 .025

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

38

oerfor-ir-a;,■
Ls each

e s

o f

? a r i a n c e
Payoff

Block 1
P

?

1 Block 2
S'

f Block 3
i
]P
? P

i
1

Ij
j
.
1
0
j
) j |I i
j|1 j
j
i
f
I
.
>j ij 1
.1
1}0
[
jj
f!
I '
ii
j I
j
*
i

?

\ Block 4
P

s

2.03
0.18

20.28 I .005

58.96 I .001

.05

0.24

ns

17.87

.10

31.96

-'71

P

;

ns

1.52

*025

.005 | 7.47

.001 4.42

P
.005

j

.001
j

22.04
5.11

.001
.05

1

.025

8.24
14.42

.005

25.61

.001 18.82 , .005

7.01

.025 29.13 : .001

i

0.17

ns

20.28

Oin

ns

o•

0.45

6,98

P

5.35 I -05 113 g j .005 20.07
I
I
i
1
T,
!
[14.76 .005 27.00
4.42
ns *10.43 i .01
I
ns

6,35

4

.2

5

Block 5

2.06

1.10 !
s ns I 0.10

.025 17.87

.005

ns

ns

2.03 \ ns

1.15
9.56

ns 1 1.91
.025

8.00

ns

J
S

.025

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

39
to about Block 1 level in Block 3.

After the third commu

nication, cooperation rose in Block 4 to a higher point
than its previous peak in Block 2.

Then, in Block 5,

cooperation rose slightly more for the friendly condition
but fell for the unfriendly condition.

Indeed, when the

difference between the first four blocks added together
and Block 5 for the friendly condition was compared to this
difference for the unfriendly condition, the difference
between the differences was significant at the 5 percent
level for a one-tailed t-test (t = 1.74, df- 46, E« .05).
This pattern of the communication conditions
across the five blocks receives support from Duncan’s
Multiple Range tests which were performed on the mean
number of cooperative choices per block for the combined
communication conditions, for the friendly conditions and
for the unfriendly conditions.

Bor the combined conditions,

cooperation in Block 4— the one immediately after the third
communication— was significantly higher than cooperation
in each of Blocks 1 and 3 (? <-.05).

Bor the friendly

conditions, cooperation in each of Blocks 4 and 5 were
significantly higher than in Blocks 1 and 3 (P<.05):
and cooperation in Block 2 was significantly higher than
in Block 1 (P ^.05).

And finally, for the unfriendly

condition, cooperation in Block 4 was significantly higher
than cooperation in Block 3 (P <-05).
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The control curve reveals a pattern noticeably
different from the experimental curve; it not only shows
the control group starting at a strikingly lower level
of cooperation, but also decreasing even more across
Blocks 2, 3 and 4, and recovering only slightly in
Block 5.

This supports the previous observation with respect

to the communication-by-blocks interactions which were
characterized by the communication conditions’ showing
increases in cooperation from the first to the second
half of the game and the control condition's showing a
decrease.
The univariate analyses of variance for payoffs
performed on the five-trial block data for the communi
cation conditions also yielded a significant blocks
effect (B-2.94, dfv 4,128, pz_.025).

Figures 2(a),

(b) and (c) present the graphs for the mean payoffs
per five-trial block.
Again, on the first block, subjects in the commu
nication conditions earned more than subjects in the
control condition.

However, Table 6 shows that this

time only three of eight commuication conditions—
telephone-friendly, face-to-face-unfriendly and writtenunfriendly— showed significant differences.
The pattern of the payoff curves deviates slightly
from that of the choice curves.

The payoff curves do
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not show a payoff increase after each communication,
corresponding to the increase in cooperation after
each communication.

In effect, there is a decrease in

payoffs after the second communication.

However, consistent

with the increase in cooperation after the third communi
cation, for the combined conditions, the payoff measure
also showed an increase.

Again, as for the choice measure,

the difference between the first four blocks added together
and Block 5 was larger for the friendly condition than it
was for the unfriendly condition (t~1.62, df=-46, P^.IO).
However, these trends for the payoff measures
are not as obvious as those for the choice measures;
this is indicated by the fact that Duncan1s Range test
failed to show that the blocks following the second and
third communication differed significantly from any other
block.

This test did show, however, that for the

combined communication conditions subjects earned signi
ficantly less in Block 3 than in either of Blocks 1, 2
or 5.

This can be attributed more to the unfriendly

conditions than the friendly conditions, since it is in
the former that similar differences emerged.
This discrepancy between the effects of the
independent variables upon the two performance measures
justifies the initial contention that the two measures
must be treated as separate dependent variables.

This
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discrepancy may be explained, at least in part, by the
fact that four separate versions of the third communi
cation were available to subjects during the experiment,
each contingent upon the behavior of the subjects on
the previous trials.

Communication 3(a) was presented

when the subject cooperated on all ten previous game
trials: communication 3(b) when she failed to cooperate
on all previous trials, but cooperated on the latter
two trials: communication 3(c) when the subject chose
the competitive red strategy on the last trial; and finally
communication 3(d) when the subject chose the cooperative
black strategy on the last trial and the confederate
chose the competitive red strategy.

The first version

of the third communication was elicited by 22 subjects,
the second by 10 subjects, the third by 10 subjects and
the fourth by 6 subjects.

Figure 3 which compares, for

each version, performance across five five-trial blocks
shows, for the first, second and fourth versions, a
pattern similar for both choices (Figure a) and payoffs
(Figure b).

The graph for the first version shows little

difference between the blocks: that is, all blocks are
consistently high for both choices andpayoffs.

The

diagrams for the second version show a decrease in choice
and payoffs from Block 2 to Block 3; then after the
communication 3(b), both choices and payoffs increased
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for Block 4 and remained rather stable.

The diagrams

for the fourth version show a decrease in choices and
payoffs from Block 2 to Block 3; then after communication
3(d), both choices and payoffs increased for Block 4
and then decreased for Block 5.
However, contrary to these consistent patterns
for choices and'payoffs, there is a dramatic deviation in
this pattern for communication 3(c).

First, the choice

measure shows a decrease from Block 2 to Block 3, whereas
the payoff measure remains stable.

Then, and most impor

tant, after communication 3(c), choices increased from
Block 3 to 4 whereas payoffs decreased.

This phenomenon

in Block 4 was due to the nature of the third version,
such that the confederate called for the subject to play
black when she herself would play red; this meant of
course that the subject, by cooperating would lose
money; but this move was required if the two partners
were to embark upon a cooperative relationship; and this
they tended to do, as indicated by the fact that payoffs
increased for Block 5.
In brief, therefore, the fact thai^ for the third
version of the third communication, cooperative choices
may increase while payoffs decrease accounts for the
discrepancy often noted between the effects of the
independent variables upon the two performance measures.
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Post-experimental Bating Scales
A factor analysis on the items of each of the
three post-experimental rating scales was performed by
first inter-correlating the items in the rating scale
and by then performing a principal components analysis
and a varimax rotation of principal components with
eigenvalues greater than 1.
Pactors of "Other person" scale,

Table 7

presents the correlation matrix and Table 8 the factor
matrix for the "Other person" semantic differential
rating scale.

Six factors emerged from the principal

components analysis.
factor (OP)I loaded highest on pleasant-unpleasant,
friendly-unfriendly, admirable-contemptible, altruisticegotistic, unselfish-selfish and good-bad, in the order
given; these reflect a Pleasantness-Priendliness factor.
It is evident, from the high intercorrelations among
these items in Table 7, that the subjects consistently
viewed the confederate as being either friendly or un
friendly.
factor (OP)II loaded highest on controllingunconstraining, aggressive-meek, active-passive, dynamicsubdued and domineering-submissive, in that order; these
reflect a Control-Aggression-Activity factor.

Thus,

subjects consistently perceived an element of direction
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TABLE 7

Intercorrelations of items in "Other person" semantic differential
¥
Adjective pairs
*
1 pleasant-unpleasant

j

2

friendly-unfriendly

\

3

admirable-contemptible

4

altruistic-egotistic

j 70 66
i
j 50 35 50

5
6
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7
8

controlling-unconstrainingj -33--31--27 3--36-10
aggressive-meek
j-46-45--50--19--54--39

good-bad

9 active-passive
10 dynamic-subdued
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15 cooperative-competitive
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22 persuasive-unpersuasive
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25 shrewd-dull

10 07 09 15. 06 04
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11 11 37

36 -Of
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ifferential -rating s0al8 (H = 48)
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TABLE 8

Varimax rotations of principal axis solution— "Other person"
semantic differential rating scale (N — 48)

Adjective pairs
t

Factors
HI'? IV %

r

pleasant-unpleasant

8 4 j 23 j

friendly-unfriendly

81 ;
i
!
i 26 C

admirable-contemptible

VI
1 8 1 00 f 20 | 15
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12
07:< 01
2 6 1 39 -03 I 0 6
2 0 14 -02 | 01

731 21 |
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70 f-2 0

\!
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| 4 1 j 23

07 ( 08
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6 2 | 08

\
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in the other person (see Table 7); this is not surprising
in view of the fact that the other person, by being
assigned the communicator's role in this one-way commu
nication situation, was in control of the situation.
factor (OP)III loaded highest on fair-unfair,
objective-biased, trustworthy-tricky, cooperative-competi
tive and credible-suspicious, in that order; thus, these
reflect a Fairness-Trustworthiness-Cooperativeness
factor.

Therefore, when the confederate was perceived

as being fair, she was rated more trustworthy and more
cooperative.
Factor (OP)IV loaded highest on skillful-unskill
ful, clever-stupid, expert-ignorant and competent-incom
petent, in that order; these reflect a SkillfulnessCleverness factor.

This indicates that an element of skill

arises in the subjects' perceptions of the other person
as they interact with her in a Prisoner's Dilemma situation.
Factor (0P)V loaded highest on experiencedinexperienced, persuasive-unpersuasive, assuring-unassuring and strong-weak, in that order; these reflect an
Experience-Persuasiveness-Potency factor.

The more

experience a person has, the more persuasive and potent
is she in her approach in a prisoner's dilemma situation.
Finally, Factor (OP)VI loaded highly on only
one item, shrewd-dull.

This loading, combined with the
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factor's weaker loadings on trustworthy-tricky and
dynamic-subdued seem to reflect a Quick-wittedness
factor.
Factors of "Experiment" scale.

Table 9 presents

the correlation matrix and Table 10 the factor matrix
for the "Experiment" semantic differential rating scale.
Three factors emerged from the factor analysis.
Factor (EX)I loaded highest on valuable-worthless,
good-bad, engrossing-tiring, interesting-boring and
useful-useless, in that order; these reflect an EvaluationInterest factor.

That is, the more subjects recognized

some value in the experiment, the more they were occupied
with it.

In other words, people cannot get involved

in a task when they consider it menial.
Factor (EX)II loaded highest on genuine-deceitful,
authentic-fake, real-unreal and honest-dishonest, in
that order: these reflect a Genuineness-Authenticity
factor.

That is, subjects were consistent in recognizing

the genuineness or the fakeness of the experiment.
Factor (EX)III loaded most heavily on wellexecuted-poorly-executed and this factor was termed a
Quality-of-Execution factor.
Factors of "Message" scale.

Table 11 presents

the correlation matrix and Table 12 the factor matrix
for the "Message" semantic differential rating scale.
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TABliE 9

Intercorrelations of items in "Experiment" semantic differential
rating scale (S'- 48)

!
Adjective pairs

1

i: 2
i

1

valuable-worthless

:

|3

\

I

*
1

4
I

i

10

8

}

i

2

good-bad

44 1

3

engrossing-tiring

4

interesting-boring

\
39 ! 51 i
47j 58 !: 70?

5

useful-useless

40 j

i

7

4 i 5 j

1
r

i.
i

34 j
41 i;451i
'\

6

gehiiine-deceitful

7

authentic-fake

8

real-unreal

9

honest-dishonest

10 well executedpoorly executed

17 I 28 1!28 \ 40; 1 5 \
\ 30} 421 221
33 5 25 j
;42} 63} 291
25 i 38 j
i
04 ! 32 } 19 s 26! 221

! 01 ! 15 ! 28

1 1 1 09!

I 56 I
! 58 I
| 64 I
56 | 30 20

-01

15
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table 10

Varimax rotations of principal axis solution— "Experiment"
semantic differential rating scale (N^48)

Adjective pairs
valuable-worthle s s
good-bad
engrossing-tiring
int ere st ing-bo r ing

T

i
i
I

factors
2— r

|

04 3-14
77
72 j 24 j 10

1

21
72
j 71 | 42

!
|

37
16

1 69 1

07 i7-01

genuine-deceitful

10

90 I -06

authentic-fake

22

real-unreal

36

73 ! 16
69 j 20

honest-dishonest

07

-09
67 I
]

well executed-poorly exectued | 05

o x | 95

useful-useless

|

i
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TABLE II

Intercorrelations of items in "Message" semantic differential rating
scale (Nr: 48)

Communication Adjective pairs
Ingredient

1 j2

3 I4 |

1

Intention

communicated-not
communicated

2

Intention

clear-unclear

3

Retaliation

communicated-not
communicated

4

Retaliation

5

Expectation

6

Expectation i clear-unclear

J

7

Absolution

communi cate d-no t
communicated

08 04; 21 18

8

Absolution

clear-unclear

9

Retaliation

play red-play blank 06 20 22: 40

communicated-not
communicated

17 18

9 I 10

42i 50j j j
» I
j t I
l
291 52 42
i « *
! s !
t
14j 16| 0^-04}
i ! !
36j 12 OOj
! I i

-01-04 1$ 18!j
I
i

ocj

00'-01-16
f

93!
02; 06|
fY-p '
cr>

play red-play black

1

891

CM
O
I

10 Absolution

■ clear-unclear

15 1 6

I

03
I
1
-10 -lOf -12-13!
11
-21-22: -43
S !
1 1
13l
1

See main text and Appendix D fo3 a complete description of the
adjective pairs.
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TABLE 12

Yarimax rotations of principal axis solution— "Message" semantic
differential rating scale (N -48)

Communication Adjective pair
ingredient
Intention

I -L 1

communicated-not communicated ! 85
i
clear-unclear
1 93 |

Intention

factors
III
11
1 9

19

N

-10

04
;.08
-18

04
08

-15

41

*

Retaliation

communi cate d-no t communicated |71 j -04
clear-unclear
j 62 j -10

Retaliation

I
f

communicated-not communicated j 01 ! 98
clear-unclear
96
1 20

Expectation
Expectation

01

3

-28

-03
-09

:

1

Absolution

communicated-not communicated 1
11
J

01

Absolution

clear-unclear

| 03

00

-97 |
-98
22 ,

02
04

1

Retaliation

jt play red-play black

\ 22

-08

Retaliation

[play red-play black

! 07

°3

1

■i
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In these tables, intention refers to the confederate's
planned strategy of choosing black on the first trial,
expectation to her anticipation of the subject’s choosing
black, retaliation to her plan of choosing red on the
next trial should the subject choose red and absolution
to her plan of choosing black on the next trial should
the subject choose black after having chosen red.
Pour factors emerged from the factor analyses of
these ten items.

Factor (MS)I loaded highest on the two

intention (Partner's Intention) items, communicatednot communicated and clear-unclear and on the two
retaliation (Partner's Intention whenever You Play Red)
items, communicated-not communicated, clear-unclear;
these seem to reflect a Clarity-of-Intention factor which
we shall qualify as being of the first degree— the reasons
for which will be made apparent later.

It is reasonable

for these items to cluster together since there is some
relationship between the confederate's intention on the
first trial and her intention should the subject choose
red.
Factor (MS)II loaded highest on the two expectation
(Partner's Expectation of You) items, communicatednot communicated, and clear-unclear! these reflect a
Clarity-of-Expectation factor.

Evidently intention.is

distinct from expectation.
Factor (MS)III loaded most heavily on the two
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absolution (Partner's Intention whenever You Play Black
after Having Played Red) items, communicated-not communi
cated and clear-unclear; these reflect a Clarity-ofIntention factor which we shall qualify as being of the
second degree so as to distinguish it from factor (MS)I
which we have already called Clarity-of-Intention—
first degree.

The second degree factor differs from the

first in that it involves a greater degree of contingency
(that is, "partner's intention whenever you play black
after having played red" involves two previous responses,
whereas "partner's intention whenever you play red"
only involves one).
Finally, Factor (MS)17 loaded most heavily on
the retaliation (Partner's Intention whenever You Play
Red) and absolution (Partner's Intention whenever You
Play Black after Having Played Red) items, play redplay black: these involved prediction of actual behavior
as opposed to the others which were clarity ratings.
This factor shall be called a Move-Prediction factor.
Table 11 shows that these two items intercorrelate
negatively with each other.

This was expected since

the confederate's prepared communications called for her
to retaliate the subject's competitive response by choosing
red on the next trial, but to absolve this subject if she
then chose black by choosing black on the next trial.
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Comparison between experimental conditions on
ratings of "Other person" items.

Table 13 presents

a summary of separate multivariate and corresponding
univariate analyses of variance performed on the factor
scores and on the items of the “Other person" rating
scale, giving the effect of four levels of communication,
two levels of affect and two levels of trust upon the
dependent variables.

As before, the univariate analyses

served to locate the significant effects uncovered by
the corresponding multivariate analysis.

Table 14

summarizes the relevant means; the values in the cells
range from 1 to 7, with values below 4 referring the the
first item of the pair and values above 4 referring to
the second item.

For example, take the pleasant-unpleasant

item; subjects in the television-friendly condition rated
the other person as being rather pleasant (1.33) as compared
to subjects in the television-unfriendly condition who
rated the other person as being rather unpleasant (5.67).
Table 13 shows that the multivariate analyses
performed on the factor scores and on the items of the
“Other person" rating scale each revealed a significant
main effect for the affect variable (P< .001).

Subsequent

analyses of variance carried out on the factor scores
of this rating scale showed subjects in the friendly
condition differing significantly from subjects in the
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table

13

iltivariate and -univariate analyses of effects of four levels of communication,
vo levels of affect and two levels of trust on factor scores and items of
"Other person" rating scale

Source of Variance
Affect 1Trust IC x A C x T |A x T ?C x A x

iCommuniIcation(C)

(A)

iltivariate Tests:
Factor Scores
Items
livariate Tests:
(OP)I-Pleasantness-Eriendliness
pleasant-unpleasant
friendly-unfriendly
admirable-contemptible
altruistic-egotistic
unselfish-selfish
good-bad

r-r.

S

(I)

(

'

.0011

.-ooii

;
f
;

i '.001;

,

(OP)II-Control-Aggression-Ac tivity;
controlling-unconstraining
aggressive-meek
active-passive
dynamic-subdued
domineering-submissive
(OP)III-Fairness-Trustworthiness-j'
Cooperativeness
}
fair-unfair
objective-biased
trustworthy-tricky
cooperative-competitive
credible-suspicious

{ * . 0 5

5

I c.ooii
j -.ooi? <.ooi

;
;
mio
1
.<.io ;

j <.025i
1 <.001;
I "-025;

-..05 ;
:
[

I <.10 J
5 <.025;
\
<.005

i
r
(

(OP)V-Experience-PersuasivenessPotency
experienced-inexperienced
persuasive-unpersuasive
assuring-unassuring
strong-weak
;

'.05
I<.05
I
I<.10

\ <10

!
I
I

<.01

<.10
S10

<.10

: <-025
<.05

MO

(OP)IV-Skillfulness-Cleverness
skillful-unskillful
clever-stupid
expert-ignorant
competent-incompetent

(OP)VI-Quick-wittedness
shrew<J-_dull

|

<.025 !

<10
<.05

5
I
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TABLE 14

Mean factor scores and mean item ratings of "Other person" rating scale!

Friendly Communication Conditions
Pace-to- ri'elevi-;tele- "Oritten pTT
fsion
|phone
face

(OP)I-Pleasantne ss-Friendliness
pleasant-unpleasant
friendly-unfriendly
admirable-contemptible
altruistic-egotistic
unselfish-selfish
good-bad

-

1.020
1.17
1.17
2.00
2.17
1.50
1.67

1-0.798
! 1.33
1 1.50
I 2.33
I 2.33
I 2.00
[ 1.83

:-0.459
i 1.33
; 1.33
! 2.33
; 3.33
: 1.57
\ 1.67

-0.341
1.50
1.33
3.33
3.33
2.83
3.00

*
o
oo

Variables

1 0.127 -0.840
1 2.67 ; 4.50
j 3.00
4.17
4.00
I 3.17
3-50
I 4.33
4.67
! 3,00

0.083
3.33
2.83
2.00
2.67
3.83

(OP)II-Control-Aggression-Activity -0
controlling-unconstraining
3 •50
4 .17
aggressive-meek
4.00
active-passive
dynamic-subdued
3•33
5 .00
domine er ing-submi s sive
(OP)III-Fairness-TrustworthinessCooperativeness
fair-unfair
objective-biased
trustworthy-tricky
cooperative-competitive
credible-suspicious

! 0.264
! 1.83
! 3.17
! 2.50
\ 2.00
I 3-5°

-0.450
1.00
1.83
1.00
1.00
1.00

0.003
1.50
2.50
2.00
1.33
3.00

(OP )IV-Skillfulness-Cleverness
skillful-unskillful
clever-stupid
expert-ignorant
competent-incompe tent

.066
1 .33
3.33
1 .67
1 1 .00
1
L 2 .00
! o .304
I 2 .83
f 2 .33
3 .17
\ 2.00

1-0.155
; 2.33
i 2.17
I 3.17
12.00

0.356
2.83
2.67
2.50
2.50

0.350
3.00
2.67
2.83
2.00

(OP)V-Experience-FersuasivenessPoteney
experienced-inexperienced
persuasive-unpersuasive
as suring-unas sur ing
strong-weak

10.448
(4.00
'2.17
;1.83
\ 3-67

10.413 -0.430
2.67
< 3.83
1 1.83
■i2.17
? 1.17
1 2.33
1 2.83
I 2.83

0.082
13.50

f 0.355
2.83

(OP)VI-Quick-wittedness
shrewd-dull

b

l

o
6

6
6
6
6

s
/jo
! r
i D
s6
1 8
i 6
f.{ 6
■
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
I 6
! 6
• 6
f 6
1

1
i
1
1
\i
i
!

fo r cc

-nfrie
/ace
face

0.926
•4.67
4.33
4.67
5 .50
4.50
3.00
I 0.063
; 1.83
i 2.50
? 3.33
; 4.33
1
2.50
t

1
?-0.600
; 2.00
: 2.67
: 1,50
1.17
i 3.83
0.309
3.00
2,83
3.17
2.00

1-0.531 1 6
j 2.33
1 6
i 1.57 ■ ' 6
S 6
5 2,00
1 6
I 2.33

;
! 0.421
! 4.33
| 2.67
! 2.50
2.67

: 6
6

0.383
4.00

-0.207 1-0.053
? 2.83 i 3.33
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All

Jnfriendly Communication Conditions

io

.50
.50
.00
.33
.00

i6

.350
.00
,67
.83
.00
.531
.33
.67
.00
.33

0.309
! 6
i6
3,00
| 6 : 2 .83
'
• 6 i 3.17
1I, 6 !; 2,00
I
i
5 6 ! 0.421
: 6 j 4.33
1 6 | 2.6?
; 6 1 2.50
\ 6 2.67

.053
.33

; 6
? 6

!

6
o

!o
16
I

0.564
2.83
4.00
3.33
2.50
4.83

0.387
2.00
3.83
2.00
3.83
3.33

1-0.466
I 2.67
i 2.00
1 2.67
; 2.17
>

-0.372
2.17
1.83
3.00
2.00

1,50

1.17
1.83

N

-

-

C h c n c h c n o 'iC 'io

A,,„

6
6
6
6
6
6
6

0,070
2.90
2.90
3.33
3.52
3.23
2.54

48
48
48
48
48
48
48

0.330
2.17
2.50
2.17
2.50
2.50

6
6
6
6
6
6

-0.060
2.85
2.81
3-35
3.23

48
48
48
48
48
48

0.479
2.83
3.50
3.67
4.17
5.00

0.101
1.33
3-83
1.17
1.67
1.83

6

0.112
1.73
3.15
1.90
1.81
2.92

48
48
48
48
48
48

0.896
2.33
3-50
3.17
3.83
3.83

0.326

!6
I6

0.012

2.67
2.31
2.85
2.04

48
48
48
48
48

0.092
2.83
2.50
3.33
2.50

-0.109
2.92
2.46
2.19
2.50

48
48
48
48
48

0.872
3.84
4.67
3.83
3.17

0.016
3.13

48

-0.131
3*-00

6

2.50
2.00
2.33
1.67

2.98

-

6
6
6

6

•
i I
6
I 6

-

-

0.561

2.17
2.17
2.83
3.50
2.67
2.67

o'vc^O'iO'iO'iO'i

0.034
2.83
2.67
2.83
3.50
2.67
2.50

m cr> os cti cti

-0.600
2.00
2 .67

.003

Control

Written

ctiOmomo'vO',

-— -3 race-tc--!Televi- TeTetten ;
]sion
chone
j j face
-—
:
“ j
I
1
341 I 6 ! 0.926 f 0.956 1 0.703
5.0
6 ! •4.67 I 5.67 ! 4.67
6 h 4.33 ! 5.83 i 5.00
33
4.17
33
1 6 7 4.67 1 5.00
6 : 5.50 ! 3.83 1 4.17
33
4.50 | 5.33 I 5.33
83
16
00
i 6 : 3.00 1 3.33 j 3-33
I
0.326 1 0.320
0.063
083 ! 6
6
:
1.83
1
2.33 ] 2.50
33
2,50
I
1.50
I 1.83
6
83
/•
3.33 1 2.50 j 2.67
o
00
4.33 \ 3.50 I 2.67
6
67
6 . 2.50 1 2.17 I 2.17
.83
?

chCTiosChChcri

ing scale|

i

1-0.164
! 1.83
1 3.33
i 2.67
j 1.50

0.383 j 0.370
4 .00 1 3.50

0.024
2.33
2.67
2.83
2.33

f-0.114
! 2.00
1 3.17
! 2.17
\ 1.83

0.299 i-0.631
2.67 I 2.33

16
I 6
?6
16
I 6

J.
!6.
I6
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■unfriendly condition on Factor (OP)I (PleasantnessFriendliness) (P&L .001) and Factor (OP)II (ControlAggression-Activity) (P^.IQ); subjects in the friendly
condition rated their partner significantly more pleasant
and unconstraining than subjects in the unfriendly condi
tion.

This finding found support in the analyses of

variance performed on the individual items of the rating
scale.

Subjects in the friendly condition rated their

partner significantly more pleasant (P< .001), friendly
(P-i.001), admirable (P<.001), altruistic (P<.025),
unselfish (P^..001) and good (P^.025), therefore, the
affect manipulation in the experiment was obviously
effective.

These subjects in the friendly condition

also rated their partner significantly more unconstraining
(P^.025), meek (P k.005) and submissive (P^.01) than
subjects in the hostile condition; therefore, the .'/friendly
confederate came across as being less dominating than
the unfriendly confederate.

Finally, subjects in the

friendly condition rated their partner significantly
more objective (P^.10), cooperative (P<-.10), credible
(P

.10), persuasive (P ^.10) and weak (P<~ .05).
In addition, the univariate analyses tmcovered

differences in ratings between the four communication
conditions for credible-suspicious (P^-.IO) and experiencedinexperienced (?•£■ .025).

Duncan's Multiple Range test
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performed on the means of the four communication conditions
revealed that subjects in the telephone condition rated
the other person significantly more credible than subjects
in the television condition (P4. .05); it would appear,
therefore, that the confederate came across as more
manipulative in the television than in the telephone
condition.

With regards to the experienced-inexperienced

item, Duncan's Multiple Range test revealed that subjects
in the face-to-face condition rated the other person
significantly more inexperienced than subjects in the other
communication conditions (P< .05); therefore, it would
appear that, when the confederate participated in person,
she came across as being more natural and naive (i.e.,
inexperienced).
Finally, the communication-by-affect interaction
observed for Factor (0P)I (P < .05), due apparently to
its two scales unselfish-selfish (P< .05) and admirablecontemptible (P< .10), is worthy of note.

When Duncan's

Multiple Range test was performed on each of these items,
subjects in the hostile condition rated the other person
significantly more selfish and contemptible than subjects
in the friendly condition for each communication condition
(PC.05), except the written condition where no signi
ficant differences between the affect conditions emerged.
Therefore, the interaction noted for these variables can
be attributed to the reluctance of subjects in the written-
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unfriendly

condition to rate the other person as contemp

tible or selfish, compared to the subjects in the other
unfriendly conditions.

Unfortunately, this does not

help to explain the unusually low cooperation level of
the telephone-unfriendly condition.
Comparison between experimental conditions on
ratings of "Experiment" items.

Table 15 summarizes the

equivalent multivariate and corresponding univariate
analyses of variance performed on the factor scores and
on the items of the "Experiment" rating scale.

Table

16 presents the relevant means.
Although no significant effects were observed
in the multivariate analysis of the factor scores of the
"Experiment" rating scale, the multivariate analysis
performed on the items of the scale revealed a significant
main effect for the trust variable (P 2 .10).

When the

items of this scale were subsequently submitted to analyses
of variance, two significant differences emerged: these
were in the opposite direction to

- expectations.

High-trust subjects rated the experiment significantly
more fake and unreal than low-trust subjects (P< .025).
Note in addition that there was no difference
between communication conditions for the EvaluationInterest, Genuineness-Authenticity and Quality-of-Execution factors.

Therefore it is important to note that no
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TABLE 15

Multivariate and univariate analyses of variance of effects of four levels of
communication, two levels of affect and two levels of trust on factor scores
and items of "Experiment" rating scale

Multivariate Tests:
Factor Scores
Items

|
Source of
^ommuni- ■; Affect /Trust
bation(C)i
(A) / (T)
!
?
!
(
i
f
1
i'
i
\
?
s *.10
t
I
I
j:
1
1
1
I
I
5
J
15
r.

Univariate Tests:
(EX)I-Evaluation-Interest
valuable -wo r th.1ess
good-bad
engrossing-tiring
interesting-boring
useful-useless

I
/
?
(EX)II~Genuineness-Authenticity
genuine-deceitful
j
authentic-fake
j
real-unreal
1
honest-dishonest
j
\

(EX)III-Quality-of-Execution
well executed-poorly executed

5.

Variance
px A•
.0 x T „■A x T ;(Jx A x
J
j
|
•
1

\

j
|
j
!
1
j
r

;

M

M

i
(
1
I
I

5
{
j
i
*
'
■
j
j
}
I
| <-.02^
) < .025
f
1

j

>
|
!
j
1

\

;

‘I
}

i

l
\
\

\

;

•

$

i

i
I
J

i
i
}
s
i <.05 ;
M

5
i
;
s
1

i

\
\

1

i

j

i

i

i
i
|
!

j
1
!
1

1

*
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/
r
j . {
1
J
!
1
j
{
1
1
j
j<.10;
!
]
5
!
i

TABLE 16

i ' o r coma

Mean factor scores and mean item ratings of "Experiment" rating scale

Variables

friendly Communication Conditions
fJnfrienc
i race-to-; Teievi-j Teie- ; /vritten ; L paue-ic-j
| face
| sion
j phone |
j
[face
f

(EX)I-Evaluation-Interest
valuable-worthle ss
good-bad
engrossing-tiring
interesting-boring
useful-useless

1 -0.156 -0.495
\
2.00
1.83
1.50
1.67
3.17
3.67
2.33
2.33
2.50 j 1.33

(EX)II-Genuineness-Authenticity
genuine-de c eit ful
authentic-fake
real-unreal
honest-dishonest
(E X )III-wuality-of-Execution
well executed-poorly executed

{

0.369
2.33
2.67
4.50
2.832.67

?
|
i
1
!
j

0.004 ;
2.17
}
1.83
i
3.67
\
1.83
!
2.83
\
I
-0.347i 0.191 1 0.234 ! -0.246 1
j
2.17 | 3-00 1 3.17 j 2.50
2.50 { 2.67 I 3.50 j 2.33 i
2.50 I 2.67 ; 3.00 | 2.33 j
1.67 S 2.00 j 2.17 j 2 . 1 7
■
(5

i
i
1
!
j

6 J 0.559
6 j 2.67
6! 2.17
6 : 4.17
;
61 3-50 l
6 j 2.67 I
•

6
6
6
6
O
r*“

|-0.039 ]
! 2.50 1
f
; 2.50 |
f 3.50
'
■
!0
n
I
0:,1
X
V

1

1

0.805! -0.134 ! 0.102 i ,0.067 ;
2.50 ( 1.17 | 1.50 1
j 1.67 ;
!
i
\
s
I
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| 2- 0° j

All

N

Control

-0.031 1
2.19 I
2.02 !
3.58 |
2.50
2.33
/
0.013
2.73
2.75
2.69
2.10

48
48
48

0.247
2.83
3.00
3.17
2.83
1.83

i 1.48

48

48
48
48

48
48
48

48

-

i

2.83
2.17
2.50
2.50
1.83

6
6

0.101

48
48

N

CT\CT\ cr\ cr>CT\ CT\

fUnfriendly Communication Conditions
ons
i
H
W c e ^ - j i'elevi- [i'eis- ‘V :Trit'ten 2" TT
n ;
sion
ipiione
iiace
1
\
i
6
0.187
0.025 1-0.493
1 6 t 0.559
6
I
2.0
0
j
2.17
2.33
i 6 f 2.67
6
2.17 I 1.83 I 2.33
i
61 2.17
6
3.67 j 2.00 | 3.83
| 614.17
2,50
6
2.00
j 6 1 3-50 f 2.67
6
2.67
1 6| 2.67 | 2.00
\
■
'
:
6
1 6 :-0.039 -0.278 I 0.199 I 0.286
6
3.00
i 6 i 2.50 [ 2.50 I 3-00
6
3.50
2.67
j 6 ? 2.50 f 2.33
6
1 2.00
2.83
| 6 13-50 t 2,67
2.50
6
(2.67
I 5 12.17 [ 1.50
i
6
-0.363
i s '-0,321 i 0.444
6
1.00
1.00
2.00
j 6 ; I.00 1

CT\0\ CT\ CT\ CT\

scale
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one communication condition rated the experiment more
interesting or more fake or better executed than any other
communication condition.
Comparison between experimental conditions on
ratings of "Message1* items.

Table 17 summarizes the

equivalent multivariate and corresponding univariate
analyses of variance performed on the factor scores and
on the items of the "Message" rating scale.

Table 18

presents the relevant means.
Table 17 shows that the multivariate analysis
revealed a significant communication effect for items
(P <£.05) and a significant communication-by-affect
interaction for factor scores (P< .06) and for items
(P <.05).
The univariate analyses performed on the items
showed that the absolution (Partner's Intention whenever
You Play Black after Having Played Red) "play red-play
black" item differed across communication conditions
(P £-.025).

Duncan's Multiple Range test revealed that

subjects in the face-to-face condition answered the
play-red alternative— the incorrect answer-__
significantly more often than subjects in the television
condition who answered the play-black alternative (P <
.05).

Since the confederate presented the same communi

cation in each case, it would appear that her actual

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

65
TABLE 17

/iultivariate and. univariate analyses of variance of effects of four levels of
jommunication, two levelsof affect and two levels of trust on factor scores
and items of "Message" rating scale

Source of Variance
dommuni- ? Affect»Trust'<0 x A jO x 1) A x T
cation(C)f
(A) j (T)
/Iultivariate Tests:
Factor Scores
Items

06
S05

Jnivariate Tests:
(MS)I-Clarity-of-Intention
(first degree)
INTENTION, communicated-not
coimnunicated
INTENTION. clear-unclear
RETALIATION, communicated-not
communicated
RETALIATION. clear-unclear

<.05

^.10

.05
<.05

<

(M S )II-Clarity-o f-Expe ctat ion
EXPECTATION, communicated-not
communicated
EXPECTATION, clear-unclear

<.05

(MS)III-Clarity-of-Intention
(second degree)
ABSOLUTION, communicated-not
communicated
ABSOLUTION, clear-unclear
(MS)IV-Move-Prediction
I
RETALIATION, play red-play "black
ABSOLUTION, play red-play black <..025

:\.0 1

<.01
<..01
i

^.025
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TABLE 18

nan factor scores and mean item ratings of "Message" rating scale for tlie

ariables
\
l

Friendly Communication Conditions
FaceUr- !Televi Tele- 7 written k '
face
sion
phone |

MS)l-Clarity-of-Intention (first degree)
NTENTION. communicated-not communicated
NTEETION. clear-unclear
ETALIATION. communicated-not communicated
ETALIATION. clear-unclear

1 0.436
i 1.50
1 1-83
1.17
2.33

0.578
1.83
1.67
1.17
1.83

MS)lI-Clarity-of-Sxpectation
XPECTATION. communicated-not communicated
XP ECTATION. clear-unclear .

-0.155
1.33
1.33

-0.118
1.33
1.83

IS)III-Clarity-of-Intention (second degree)
BSOLUTION. communicated-not communicated
BSOLUTION, clear-unclear

0.620
1.00
1.00

-0.815
3.83
3.67

IS)IY-Move-Prediction
ETALIATION. play red-play black
3S0LUTI0NV play red-play black

0.837
3.00
3.00

-0.691
1.00
6.33

-0.330
1.00
1.00
1.17
1.17

0.295
1.33
1.50
1.50
1.50

6
?6
16
i6
|6

0.196 \ 0.390
2.00 | 2.33
2.00
2.50
1
-0.330 1 0.417
1.33 j 1.33
1.50 | 1.33

16
j6
\ 6

j
{
!
|

I

j

16
16
j6

-0.329 I -0.397 1 6
1.50 S 1.67 ! 6
6.33 \ 6.67 ! 6
i
1
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sonnnication conditions

r the

Unfriendly Coamunication Conditions
Vace-to- jielevx-; 'l'eie- j Vfrdt'ten'g
IT
face
fsion
fphone |
I

onditions
Irxtteh ~ X
0.295
1.33
1.50
1.50
1.50

•
:6
16
i6
j6
i6

i
;f
f
I
\

*
j
0.390 ! 6 I
2.33 j 6 1
6
2.50
l
f
0.417 1 6 1
1.33 j 6 !
1.33
!6 !
:
-0.397 1 6 •
1.67 1 6 )
6.67 i 6 }
;t

0.118
-0.445
1.17
1.17
1.00 ! 1.17
1.00 ’
l 1.50
1.00 j 1.50

-0.1511
1.33
1.17
1.50
1.17

2.50 j 1.17

6
6
6

1.102 [ 0.058
4.00 i 2.33
3.83 f 1.83

6
6
6

0 . 64 3 j -0.240
2 .67 ! 1.00

-0.315 1-0.399
1,00 f 1.00
1.00 I 1 * 3 5
0.053
1.50
2.00

\
i

0.439
1.33
i.i7

0.050 \ -0.224
1.00 I 2.00
3.33
6.17

6
6
6:
6
6

-0.499
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00

.s

-

0.108
1.00
3-17

0.645
3-17
3.67

‘

6
6
6
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presence in the experimental room distracted the subject
from the absolution ingredient of her communication.
In addition, for this item fable 17 shows a significant
effect for the affect variable (P< .025)* subjects in
the friendly condition answered the play-black alternative
the correct one— significantly more often than subjects
in the unfriendly condition.

Perhaps subjects in the

hostile condition were so concerned with their negative
reactions toward the confederate that they let the
absolution aspect of the communication slip by them.
However, despite the fact that Table 17 fails to show a
communication-by-affect interaction for this item, the
communication and affect main effects

may

be inter

preted in light of the fact that subjects in the faceto-face-friendly and -unfriendly, in the telephoneunfriendly and in the written-unfriendly conditions
answered the incorrect red alternative, while subjects
in the television-friendly and -unfriendly, telephonefriendly and written-friendly conditions answered the
correct black alternative.

This observation in the

telephone-unfriendly condition may provide some clue in
accounting for the competitive behavior of subjects in
this condition.
Table 17 also points out that the multivariate
analysis uncovered a significant communication-by-affect
interaction both for factor scores (?<.05) and items
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(P < .05).

Subsequent univariate analyses revealed signi

ficant communication-by-affect interactions for factor
(MS)II (Clarity-of-intention, second degree) (P^ .01)
and for the items communicated-not communicated and
clear-unclear (P^ .01).

The interactions pointed out

that the absolution ingredient of the communication was
least clear in the television-friendly and telephonehostile conditions.

Duncan's Multiple Range test performed

on the means of these two items for the eight experimental
conditions showed that subjects in these two conditions
rated the absolution aspect of the communication signi
ficantly less communicated and clear than subjects in
the face-to-face-friendly, written-friendly, telephonefriendly, television-unfriendly and face-to-face-unfrian<Ily
conditions (P^.05).

Therefore, of the four conditions

that answered the move prediction of the absolution
ingredient incorrectly (face-to-face-friendly, face-toface-, telephone- and written-unfriendly), only the
telephone-unfriendly condition also rated tha absolution
ingredient unclear.

It is also interesting to note that

the television-friendly condition which rated the absolution
ingredient unclear answered the move prediction of the
absolution ingredient correctly.

Therefore, it may be

that the failure of the subjects in the telephoneunfriendly condition to see the confederate's willingness
to exonerate them if they chose red prompted them to
react negatively toward her and to exhibit competitive
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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behavior.

This negative reaction failed to occur in the

television-friendly condition because of the friendliness
of the confederate: furthermore, these subjects, despite
claiming that the absolution ingredient of the communi
cation was unclear, were aware that the confeaerate
would absolve them if they chose black after having chosen
red by choosing black.
Comparison between experimental and control
conditions on ratings of "Other person" items.

Since

the control subjects also responded to the "Other person"
and "Experiment" rating scales, it was deemed useful
to compare tneir responses to those of all the other
subjects and also to those of each of the communication
conditions separately.

Table 19 carries a summary of

these analyses for the "Other person" rating scale.
Table 14- again presents the relevant means.
Table 19 reveals for factor (OP)I (PleasantnessPriendliness) significant differences between the controls
and face-to-face-, television- and telephone-unfriendly
conditions.

The differences noted for the items on

which this factor loaded can be characterized as follows:
the experimentals in the friendly condition responded
more positively to the items than the controls while
those in the unfriendly condition responded more negatively
than the controls.

These differences between controls
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TABLE 19
Comparison between controls and communication conditions on factor scores

Variables

I All

>Friendly Communication Conditi;
■tPace- to*-Tele vi-f Televvrit'ceh T
Iface
?sion
?hone
i

(OP)I-Pleasantness-Friendliness
pleasant-unpleasant
friendly-unfriendly
admirable-contemptible
altruistic-egotistic
unself ish-selfish
good-bad

! ^-05
?

.10

4.10

4'.01

i*

I 4 .10
\ * .10

(OP)II-Control-Aggression-Activityf
controlling-unconstraining
j!
aggressive-meek
j
active-passive
I
dynamic-subdued
5
domineering-submissive
■
;<
I
I
(OP)III-Pairness-TrustwortMness- !
Cooperativeness
|
fair-unfair
|
objective-biased
|
trustworthy-tricky
i
cooperative-competitive
I
credible-suspicious
?

<.10

A .i.1\f
4.10

.05
,025

4.05
* .05

4 .025 ! <.10
4 .005 f
4 .10 \
4.025 I
c ,025 1
,025
^.025 I

.05

,01

<

.01

(OP)IV-SkiHfulness-Cleverness
skillful-unskillful
clever-stupid
expert-ignorant
competent-incompetent
(OP)V-Sxperience-Persuasivene ssPotency
experienced-inexperienced
persuasive-unpersuasive
assuring-unassuring
strong-weak

.025
.005
..01

<.02 5 |
4 .025
^ .05

,05

(OP)VI-Quick-wittedness
shrewd-dull
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.01
< .005

<

<.025
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bor scores

m Condition:
jt: I "Wrrften
le i:

: r i d items of "Other person" rating scale

friendly Communication Conditions
-face- Lu—*Tele v'r'^~re'l^=r_“ ;/rrlrfrCT:
face
}sion
iphone 4
T Z

LO

<.01

r .005
*.10
<.10
< .05
* .10

.001 * * .05
1 *.001 1 *.10
I * .005 1 *. 025
* .025
% <

s .01

.01

<r .'025 I. *.10

- .10

<.10
2 .10

^

.10

< .05

..05 ! *.05

-

10 I

.10

- .05

025 1
025 | <.025
025 5

■01 |
.005

.10

- .05

.025

025 \ <.10
005 f

025}

I

.10
*.10

.025

<.025

*

I <105
'■

.10

. .

-20

<.05
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and experimentals were especially prevalent in the
unfriendly conditions.
No significant differences appeared for Factor
(OP)II (Control-Aggression-Activity).

However, for the

items of this factor, where significant differences
appeared, the experimentals rated the other person more
controlling, aggressive and active than the controls
(see Table 14).

This makes sense in view of the fact

that in the communication conditions the confederate
in her communicator role controlled the situation.
For Factor (OP)III (Fairness-TrustworthinessCooperativeness), several significant differences emerged,
both for the factor itself and for the items; where
significant differences appeared, the experimentals
rated the other person more fair, trustworthy and coopera
tive than the controls, regardless of the affect condition
(see Table 14).

This occured most frequently in the

telephone-friendly and written-unfriendly conditions.
Therefore, it would appear that, with communication,
the subject's perception of her partner is different
from the perception of the subject in a typical prisoner’s
dilemma experiment where no explicit communication is
possible.

That is, when subjects are not allowed to

communicate, they perceive thei^nartner as being untrust
worthy and competitive.

This explains the prevalence of
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competitive behavior so typical of subjects in a typical
prisoner’s dilemma situation where explicit communication
is unavailable (Rapoport, 1963).
Finally, for Factor (OP)V (Experience-PersuasivenessPotency), a number of differences appeared between the
ratings of the controls and the ratings of the experimentals,
especially for those in the friendly conditions.

Where

differences appeared, the experimentals rated the other
person significantly more experienced, persuasive and
potent.

This again is expected in view of the fact that

the confederate could communicate her message and therefore
bring herself to bear on the subject.
Comparison between experimental and control
conditions on ratings of "Experiment" items.

Table 20

contrasts experimental subjects with control subjects
for the "Experiment" rating data.
relevant means.

Table 16 presents the

When differences appeared between the

ratings of the controls and experimentals, the controls
rated the experiment significantly more worthless and
bad than the experimentals.

Therefore, it would seem

that subjects who cannot communicate explicitly in a
prisoner's dilemma experiment tend to respond negatively
in evaluating the experiment.

A previous finding in

this study indicated that, the more subjects recognized
some value in the experiment, the more they were occupied
with it.

This would indicate that the typical no-
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TABLE 20
Comparison Between controls and communication conditions on factor score

Variables

(EX)I-Evaluation-interest
valuabl e-worthie ss
good-bad
engrossing-tiring
interesting-boring
useful-useless

All

.10
.05

friendly Communication Conditions
Bace-to- i Televi| Teie- 1Written
face
sion
|phone
t
!
i
t
i
f

.10

I
Y

j
\
I

i
5
i,
c
•
i
i

(EX)II-Genuineness-authenticity
genuine-deceitful
authentic-fake
real-unreal
honest-dishonest

i

(EX)111-Quali ty-o f-Exe cution
well executed-poorly executed

j

!

f
:

I
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ctor score

Conditior
l Written"

.terns of "Experiment" ratin g scale

[Unfriendly Communication Conditions
Written
jface- -to- -?felevi-] Tele]sion
]phone
face
w.\
I 1- —
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communication prisoner’s dilemma experiment leaves the
subject with negative impressions regarding its value and
consequently the subject fails to become involved.
Results Associated with the Trust Variable
Since no effects could be attributed to the trust
variable in the analyses of the performance data, some
trust effects in the rating scales have been so far
disregarded.

At this point, these few findings are

worthy of mention.
First, Table 13 shows a significant affect-bytrust interaction for Factor (OP)I (Pleasantness-Friendliness) of the "Other person" rating scale (P * .05).

This

interaction is due apparently to the affect-by-trust
interaction observed for the two items:

friendly-

unfriendly ( P .05) and admirable-contemptible (P^ .10).
For the friendly condition, hi ih-trust subjects rated
the other person friendly (1.42) and admirable (2.58),
while low-trust subjects rated the other person only
slightly more friendly (1.25) and admirable (2.41).
However for the unfriendly condition, high-trust subjects
rated the other person somewhat less friendly (3.58) and
admirable (3*41), while low-trust subjects rated the other
person somewhat unfriendly (5.33) and contemptible (4 .92).
Keeping in mind that a rating of less than 4 signifies
friendly and admirable while a rating of more than 4
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signifies -unfriendly and contemptible, the interaction
can be attributed to the reluctance of subjects in the
high-trust condition to rate the hostile confederate
as being unfriendly and contemptible.
Another affect-by-trust interaction was observed
for the valuable-worthless item of the "Experiment"
rating scale (P <.05).

For the friendly condition,

high-trust subjects rated the experiment very valuable
(1.75), while low-trust subjects rated it less valuable
(2.42).

For the -unfriendly condition, high-trust subjects

rated the experiment less valuable (2.57) while low-trust
subjects rated it more valuable (1.92).

Therefore, all

the groups rated the experiment on the valuable end of
the scale.

However, the interaction can be attributed

to the tendency of the friendly-low-trust group and the
unfriendly-high-trust group to rate the experiment
somewhat less valuable.
Finally, another affect-by-trust interaction
was noted in the "Message" rating scale for Factor
(MS)II (Clarity-of-Expectation) (p c.05) and its two
items eommunicated-not communicated (P< .05) and clearunclear (P<.05).

For the friendly condition, high-trust

subjects rated the expectation ingredient of the communi
cation as being only somewhat communicated (2.25) and
clear (2.42) while the low-trust subjects rated it more
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communicated (1.25) and clear (1.41).

On the other hand*

for the unfriendly condition, high-trust subjects rated
the expectation ingredient most communicated (1*00)
and clear (1.00) while the low-trust subjects rated it
somewhat less communicated (1.83) and clear (2.00).
In view of the fact that each group rated these items
below 4, each felt that the expectation ingredient of
the communication was clear.

However, the interaction

can be attributed to the reluctance of high-trust subjects
in the friendly condition and of low-trust subjects in
the unfriendly condition to rate the expectation ingre
dient as being extremely communicated and clear.
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DISCUSSION
This experiment has uncovered a number of impor
tant results:

(1) the effect of communication versus

no communication on cooperation in the prisoner’s
dilemma game: (2) the effect of repeating a communication,
with appropriate modifications when necessary; (3) the
effect of different kinds of communication channels which
are commonly used in actual life: (4) tne effect of commu
nicator friendliness and its interaction with communication
channel: and (5) the dimensionality of subjects' per
ceptions of the other person, the experiment and the
communication.
Effects of Communication in General
first, with regards to communication effects
in general, the results ofithis experiment support the
hypothesis that one-way communication which is honest,
firm and correct facilitates cooperative interaction in
a prisoner's diletmna situation.

It would appear that

these types of messages instill in subjects trust which,
as Deutsch (1958) has indicated, plays a critical role
in facilitating cooperation in prisoner's dilemma games:
that is, the messages enabled the subjects to be reason
ably certain that the other person would reciprocate their
cooperative response and would not deliberately exploit
them by selecting the competitive strategy.

Our results

are consistent with those of a number of other investi-
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gators who have studied different aspects of communi
cation in prisoner's dilemma situations (Bixenstine &
Douglas, 1967; Bixenstine et al., 1966; Deutsch, 1958,
I960; Loomis, 1959* ferhune, 1968; Wallace

&

Rothaus,

1969, Wichman, 1970).
In addition, the competitive behavior of the
control subjects in this experiment is also character
istic of the behavior of subjects in a PD situation
(Rapoport, 1963).

We reiterate, as have each of the

above investigators, that subjects' failure to cooperate
in a typical prisoner's dilemma situation is due to the
fact that there is no contact between partners, beyond
the knowledge of the other person's previous choice.
Indeed, after the experiment, several control subjects
admitted the benefit of the mutual cooperative strategy;
however, they said that they failed to carry it out
because they could not trust the other person to reci
procate their cooperative choice.
mental rating scales have helped

Also, the post-experi
interpret the competitive

behavior of the controls by revealing that, without
communication, subjects' perception of the other person
is different from the perception of the subjects with
communication.

Without communication, subjects reacted

more negatively toward the other person— that is, they
rated the other person more unfair, untrustworthy,
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competitive and unpersuasive; with communication, subjects
reacted more positively toward the other person— that is,
they rated the other person more fair, trustworthy,
cooperative and persuasive.

In addition, subjects who

could not communicate explicitly tended to respond
negatively in evaluating the experiment and were less
occupied with it.
Effect of Repeating a Communication
This experiment also showed that, for all commu
nication conditions, the mean number of cooperative
choices per five-trial block increased in the block
immediately after each communication, only to fall
during the next block— almost as if the effects of the
communication were dissipating.

However, despite this

decrease, immediately after the next communication,
cooperation in that block reached a higher peak than its
previous plateau.

Moreover, on the final block of the

game, after the third and final communication, coopera
tion actually increased slightly for subjects in the
friendly condition, but decreased for subjects in the
unfriendly condition.

Therefore, communication— or at

least the third communication— had an enduring effect in
the friendly communication conditions but not in the
unfriendly conditions.
Contrast this pattern for the communication
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conditions with the behavior of the controls which showed
corresponding decreases in cooperation as the game
progressed.

Cooperation did increase slightly on the

last block, but this did not offset the previous decline.
Effect of Communication Channel
Next, the significant main effects attributed
to the communication variable is worthy of mention.

This

experiment has demonstrated the usefulness of studying
the effect of the communication medium on interpersonal
interactions.

It was hypothesized that increasing the

number of communication modes for a given message would
result in more cooperation.

This proposition was based

on the premise that differing amounts and kinds of
information are transmitted by written, vocal and visual
modes and between direct face-to-face and indirect
communication means.

For example, Mehrabian (1968) has

suggested that communication.-is 7 percent verbal, 38
percent vocal and 55 percent visual.

The results of

this experiment supported this hypothesis in part.
Subjects in the face-to-face and television communication
conditions, which capitalize on all three communication
modes, exhibited more cooperation and earned signifi
cantly greater payoffs than subjects in the telephone
condition, which capitalizes on only the linguistic and
paralinguistic modes.

This observation is consistent
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with, that of Wichman (1970) who noted that subjects who
could see and hear each other cooperated more than subjects
who could only hear each other,

unexpectedly, the present

subjects in the written condition, which capitalizes on
only the linguistic mode, fell in between the face-toface and television conditions on the one hand and the
telephone condition on the other; it did not differ
significantly from any of these other communication
conditions.

Unfortunately, v/ichman (1970) did not have

an equivalent condition to our written condition.
This communication effect noted in this study
is significant at the five percent level for the payoff
performance measure; but it fails to attain significance
for the choice measure, although it does approach
significance at the ten percent level.

This discrepancy

between the significance tests for the two performance
measures may be due to the absolute value of the numbers
involved.

That is, the choice measure was quantified by

scoring black cooperative choices 1 and red competitive
choices 0. On the other hand, the payoff data consisted
of the subject’s earnings as determined by the values
in the various cells of the matrix which ranged from 1
to 5-

Therefore, the payoff data represent

a wider

range than the choice data, which accounts, for the
failure of the analysis of variance to result in a
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statistically significant difference for choices.

Since

subjects were concerned with payoffs rather that choices,
it is important to give due attention to payoffs as a
dependent variable rather .'than restrict analyses to choice
data.
Consistent with the original hypothesis, it was
expected that the written communication condition, which
capitalizes only on the linguistic mode, would experience
the lowest cooperation level; therefore, it was hypo
thesized that the scarcity of nonverbal cues would be
dysfunctional to any meaningful interaction.
this was not the case.

However,

Subjects in the written condition

performed more cooperatively and earned greater payoffs
(although not significantly) than subjects in the telephone
condition.

However, this fact still does not discount the

original hypothesis.

Subjects in the note condition

were observed rereading the notes a number of times.
Of course, it was impossible for subjects in the other
conditions to receive more than one exposure to each
communication.

Therefore, the mope cooperative behavior

of subjects in the written condition can be attributed to
their increased understanding of the content of the com
munication.

Although this situation approaches most closely

real life, it might be useful in a further investigation
to place the written note on a revolving drum so that the
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subjects would recieve only one exposure to the communi
cation.
Effect of Communicator Friendliness
With regards to the affect variable, this experi
ment showed that, even though communication elicits more
cooperation than no communication, the kind of affect
expressed by the communicator is important.

A friendly

approach is relatively more effective in;inducing coope
ration and leads to higher payoffs than an unfriendly
approach: this is consistent with the original hypothesis.
Subjects in the unfriendly condition, more so than subjects
in the friendly condition, hesitated to choose the coope
rative alternative because, as several of them described
after the experiment, they felt that the other person
was the type of person who would deliberately deceive
them and choose the exploitive competitive alternative
to satisfy her own needs.

Indeed, subjects in the unfriendly

condition rated the other person more unpleasant, controlling
and competitive than subjects in the friendly condition,
which may explain why they reacted competitively toward
the other person.
Gommunication-by-affect Interaction
However, it is extremely important that these
significant main effects for communication and affect
be interpreted in light of the communication-by-affeet
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interaction observed in this experiment.

Of the eight

communication-by-affect conditions, the telephone-unfriendly
condition stands out most noticeably with its low level
of cooperation and lower payoffs.

Indeed, it was the only

condition which failed to differ from the competitivelyoriented controls.

In addition, only in the telephone

communication condition did subjects in the unfriendly
condition make significantly fewer cooperative responses
and earn substantially lower payoffs than their counter
parts in the friendly condition.

Therefore, the competi

tive performance of the telephone condition noted pre
viously must be attributed to the competitive behavior
of the subjects in the telephone-unfriendly condition.
And also, the competitive performance of the subjects
in the unfriendly conditions must be ascribed in large
part to this same telephone-unfriendly condition.
Therefore, it would appear than subjects in the
telephone-unfriendly condition were less able to profit
from communication than subjects in the other communi
cation conditions- these subjects were inclined to give
free vent to their negative reactions by behaving compe
titively toward the confederate.

This parallels the

everyday situation where people feel freer to "give shit"
to other people when they cannot see them.

This false

sense of security which accompanies such a reaction may
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be attributed to the fact that the speaker enjoys
anonimity: furthermore, she may feel less threatened
in the event that the other should rebuke her because
the lack of visual cues in the communication medium
creates an impression of distance between herself and
the other person.

These post hoc explanations must be

regarded as hypotheses that may be investigated in future
research.
One may ask why the same competitive behavior
fails to appear in the written.condition where, because
of the lack of visual cues, this same anonimity and impres
sion of distance occurs.

An examination of the subjects’

response to the post-experimental "Message" rating scale
provides
problem.

some clues as to the solution of this
Subjects in the telephone-unfriendly condition

did not succeed in grasping the absolution aspect of the
confederate's message 'whereas subjects in the writtenunfriendly condition did see this, perhaps because they
could reread the notes at will until they felt that they
grasped the content of the message.

This would suggest

that the knowledge that the confederate would return to
the cooperative strategy if they cooperated after having
competed is crucial in inducing subjects to cooperate,
at least when they are visually isolated from the other
person.

This again is another hypothesis worthy of
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experimental investigation.
One final note regarding applying the communicationby-affect interaction to the interpretation of the main
affect effect is necessary.

As mentioned already, subjects

in the telephone-unfriendly condition reacted signifi
cantly more negatively than subjects in the telephonefriendly condition.

Similarly siibjects in the television-

and written-unfriendly conditions behaved more competiti
vely— although not significantly more— than their
counterparts in the friendly condition.

However, it is

surprising to see subjects in the face-to-face-unfriendly
condition behaving slightly more cooperatively— (yes,
cooperatively S)— than subjects in the face-to-face
friendly condition.

And in addition the subjects in the

face-to-face-unfriendly condition were just as adamant
in their negative rating of the other person as were
the other subjects in the unfriendly conditions.

Since

the ratings provide no clue in interpreting the cooperative
bbehavior of the face-to-face-unfriendly condition, then
perhaps their behavior can be explained by the fact that
they feared to antagonize the other person because of
the physical proximity between them and the other person.
This is another question for future investigators to answer.
Dimensionality of Subjects* Perceptions of Other Person,
Experiment and Message
This experiment also uncovered some distinct
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dimensions in the subjects' perceptions of the other
person, the experiment and the message.
Perceptions of other person.

First, with regards

to the subjects' perceptions of the other person, six
factors emerged:
(OP)I-Pleasantness-Friendliness
(OP)II-Control-Aggression-Activity
(OP)III-Pairness-Trustworthiness-Cooperativeness
(OP )IV-Skillfulness-Cleverness
(OP)V-Experience-Persuasiveness-Potency
(OP)VI-Ouick-wittedness
Some of these seem to parallel tnose r e gularly found
for the affective meanings of concepts in general
(Osgood et al., 1957): evaluation (here PleasantnessPriendliness), potency (here Experience-PersuasivenessPotency) and activity (here Control-Aggression-Activity).
As already noted in this discussion section,
the subjects' ratings on the items of these factors often
provided clues in explaining their behavior in the
experiment.

Recall, for example, that subjects in the

friendly condition rated their partner significantly
more pleasant on the Pleasantness-Eriendliness factor,
significantly more unconstraining on the Control-AggressionActivity factor and significantly more cooperative on
the Eairness-Trustworthiness-Cooperativeness factor than
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subjects in the unfriendly condition: this sheds some
light on the cooperative behavior exhibited by the
subjects in the friendly conditions.

Recall also that

subjects in the communication conditions, when compared
to the controls, rated the other person more fair on the
Pairness-Trustworthiness-Cooperativeness factor and more
experienced on the Experience-Persuasiveness-Potency
factor.

These perceptions of the communication subjects

help explain the cooperative behavior of these subjects
as compared to the competitive behavior of subjects in
the no-communication conditions.
In summary therefore, the subjects' perceptions
of the other person vary from one condition to the next,
providing some explanation for their behavior in the
prisoner's dilemma game.
Perceptions of experiment. With regards to the
subjects' perceptions of the experiment, three very
distinct dimensions emerged:
(EX)I-Evaluation-Interest
(EX)II-Genuineness-Authenticity
(EX)III-Quality-of-Execution
Note that the Evaluation-Interest factor parallels the
evaluation factor in the affective meanings of concepts
(Osgood et al., 1957).
Very important here is the fact that the various
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conditions, including the control no-communication
condition, did not differ in their ratings on the two
dimensions of Genuineness-Authenticity and Quality-ofExecution.

These observations point to the very important

conclusion that the conditions did not vary in their
impressions of the legitimacy and the carrying-out of
the experiment.
Similarly, the four communication conditions,
excluding the controls, did not show any differences
in their ratings on the Evaluation-Interest factor.
Therefore, among the communication conditions, at least,
there was no difference in the subjects' evaluation of
the experiment and their interest in participating.
However, one important difference in the ratings
on the Evaluation-Interest factor did appear; subjects
in the control condition rated the experiment significantly
less valuable and less interesting than subjects in the
communication conditions.

It would appear therefore that

the control subjects, not holding high estimations of
the study, would be inclined to disregard the instruction
requesting them to concern themselves with their own
earnings and feel free to do as they please, which, in
a competitive situation like the PD game, Mvould appear to
be to compete— even if it means their losing money.
Perceptions of message.

With regards to the
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subjects * perceptions of the message, four factors
emerged:
(MS)I-Clarity-of-Intention (first degree)
(MS)II-Clarity-of-Expectation
(MS)III-Clarity-of-Intention (second degree)
(MS)I7-Move-Prediction
The Clarity-of-Intention (first degree)factor included
the subjects’ impressions of how communicated and clear
were the confederate's planned choice on the first trial
and her planned choice when the subjects chose red.

The

Clarity-of-Expectation factor consisted in the subjects'
impressions of how communicated and clear was the confe
derate' s anticipation of their first choice in the game.
The diarity-of-Intention (second degree) factor included
the subjects' impressions of how communicated and clear
was the confederate's planned choice when they chose
black after having chosen red.

finally, the Move-

Prediction factor consisted in the subjects' actual
forecast of what the confederate would play after they
played red and what the confederate would play when they
played black after having played red.
Note that the factors obtained on the message ratings
in this experiment do not agree with Deutsch's (1958)
four minimum ingredients of a cooperative interchange
(intention, expectation, retaliation and absolution)
around which the messages were actually built;

the
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Clarity-of-Intention (first degree) factor incorporates
Deutsch's Intention and Retaliation factors; and this
experiment adds a Move-Prediction factor which did not
exist in Deutsch's categorization.
The subjects' responses to the absolution item
of the Move-Prediction factor and to the two items of
the Clarity-of-Intention (second degree) factor— which,
as mentioned, deals with the subjects' impressions of how
communicated and clear was the absolution aspect of the
communication— sheds some light on the competitive
behavior of the telephone-unfriendly condition.

These

subjects completely missed the absolution aspect of the
communication, as indicated by the fact that they answered
the move prediction item incorrectly; but more important,
with respect to the Clarity-of-Intention (second degree)
factor, they also rated the absolution ingredient
unclear.

Therefore, the competitive behavior of the

telephone-unfriendly condition may be due to the failure
of these subjects to see that the confederate would return
to the cooperative choice if they themselves would return
to it.
Trust Variable
In closing up the discussion of the results obtained
in this study, it must be emphasized that no significant
main effects could be attributed to the trust variable in
any of the performance analyses.

Perhaps another
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study where subjects were drawn from greater extremes
of the distribution of scores and where the competitive
overtones which accompany prisoner* s dilemma did not
exist might provide different results.
Implications of the Study
The results of this study have a number of impli
cations, both for PD research and for the real world.
first, for prisoner's dilemma research, this
study supports the contention that explicit communication,
rather than the mere sequence of choices, is necessary
to induce a subject to cooperate in a PD situation.

This

experiment has shown, as have others (Bixenstine &
Douglas, 1967; Bixenstine et al., 1966; Deutsch, 1958,
I960; Loomis, 1959; Terhune, 1968; Wallace & Rothaus,
1969; Wichman, 1970), that subjects who can communicate
in a prisoner's dilemma game tend to cooperate more than
subjects who cannot.

It has been shown, in addition,

that the perception of subjects with regards to the other
person and the experiment itself differ for subjects
who can communicate and for subjects who cannot. And
*j
this has been related to their behavior in the game.
All these observations o^uestion the generality of the
hundreds of prisoner's dilemma experiments performed in
the last decade.

It is evident that, when subjects cannot

communicate beyond the mere knowledge of the other person's
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previous response, a competitive atmosphere which induces
subjects to risk the competitive strategy prevails.
This situation, where individuals are deprived of the
opportunity to adjust their behavior to others with
the help of covert communication rarely occurs in real
life.
This research also has a number of implications
for the real world.

First, in a society which may

someday see many of us interacting in a work situation
on closed-circuit television, even in the present state
of technology (libby, 1969), there is some consolation
that the television medium is as effective as the faceto-face medium in transmitting information and in induc
ing cooperation.

Indeed, it has been shown with the

absolution ingredient of the message that television
is perhaps more effective in getting across more complex
notions which may excape the receiver of the communication
in the flurry of cues that accompany face-to-face interaction.
But this research also has implications for the
present world in terms of within- and between-organization
communication,
First, the prisoner's dilemma game itself is
a prototype of the problem of coordination which occurs
so often in the real world.

Often individuals in organi

sations (e.g., two department heads) are faced with the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

94
choice of either cooperating or competing with each other,
with the result that mutual cooperation leads to moderate
benefits for both (e.g., a bonus), that cooperation by
one and competition by the other leads to losses for the
person who cooperated (e.g., a cut in salary) and strong
gains for the person who competed (e.g., a promotion), but
that mutual competition leads to severe repercussions
for both (e.g., a demotion).

The same pattern applies

for inter-organizational relations.

This study suggests

that the mutual cooperative strategy, which is the best
strategy in the long run, will not develop unless the
parties— whether individuals or organizations— are able
to coordinate their activity by communicating with each
other.

And more yet, this study showed that the bene

ficial effects of communication are felt mostly immediately
after the communication, only to dissipate a little later:
therefore the necessity of frequent communication to
maintain mutual cooperation cannot be overemphasized.
And in addition, this study suggests that a communicator
who adopts an unfriendly approach while trying to induce
another person to cooperate with him on some venture of
mutual concern is more likely to induce the other to
cooperate with him if the interaction is face-to-face
than if it is by telephone.

But in general, it was shown

that a friendly approach in the communication interaction
is more effective in inducing cooperation than an unfriendly
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approach..

This applies as much to inter-individital

interactions within an organization as it does to
inter-organizational interactions.
These same generalizations apply to most other
interaction situations or competitions: husband-wife
relationships, buyer-seller transactions, teacher-student
interactions, union-management bargaining, international
peace negotiations...All these types of situations can
benefit from the indication that frequent communication
from a friendly communicator is useful in maintaining
a cooperative relationship.
future Investigations
This study also open doors to a host of future
investigations in the area of the effect of communication
channel on interpersonal interactions.
first, a replication of this study would be necessary
in order to establish the reliability of the major findings
in this study, expecially the competitive behavior of the
telephone-unfriendly condition, the cooperative behavior
of subjects in the friendly conditions and the increase
in cooperation immediately after each communication.
And then, some refinements could be made in the postexperimental rating scales in order to clarify a few
unresolved issues,

first, since some subjects experienced

difficulty understanding the message rating scale, this
scale should be re-written to include all the confederate's
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contingencies more clearly.

Then, since one of the problems

in interpreting prisoner1s dilemma results is that the
competitive red choice may represent either an attempt
at exploitation or a purely defensive maneuver (lerhune,
1968), the replication should ask what is expected of the
partner when the subject defects, in order to reveal
with greater clarity the meaning of this choice.

Next,

the replication should include a question designed to
answer the extent to which the subjects felt that they
avoided the typical competitive orientation in favor of the
individualistic orientation; this is important in inter
preting the results.
Then further studies could be conducted varying
other dimensions.

Nor example, our subjects were instruct

ed to concern themselves only with their own earnings
(individualistic orientation).

It would be necessary to

include-in a future study instructions requesting the
subjects to try and beat the other person (competitive
orientation) and instructions requesting the subjects
to help the other person (cooperative orientation).
Then we could investigate the effect of different commu
nication channels and affect conditions in counteracting
the competitive orientation and in supporting the coopera
tive orientation.
In a similar vein, since in our experiment,
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subjects were unaware of the other person's cumulative
outcome, another study should be undertaken in which the
cumulative outcomes of both participants were announced.
This should increase the competitive overtones of the
experiment, which may be differentially counteracted by
the various communication channels and affect conditions.
Then another study identical to ours should be
run using male subjects and a male confederate in order
to study male reactions with differing communication
channels and affect conditions.

In addition another

study should be undertaken using males and females,
with a confederate of the opposite sex, in order to
study subject reactions to a confederate of the opposite
sex for varying communication channels and affect
conditions.
Another idea for a later investigation might be
to study sender commitment versus receiver commitment
(Deutsch, 1958) for various communication channels.
Deutsch has noted that the sender is more prone to behave
in accordance to his message than the receiver because
the sender has committed himself by the very fact that
he sent the message in the first place; on the other
hand, the receiver is bound by no such commitment.

It

would be worthwhile studying the effects of different
communication channels on sender and receiver commitment.
Following from this, it might be interesting to program
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the confederate-receiver to cooperate or to compete with
the subject-eommunicator, and to study the effect of this
on the behavior of the subject-communicator for the
various communication channels.
It would also be important to follow up on our
observation that only the face-to-face condition— both
friendly and unfriendly— failed to see an increase in
cooperation after the second communication, whereas all
the other communication conditions did.
It is also likely that the status of the other
person may have different effects on subjects for
different communication channels and affect conditions.
Therefore, it might be useful to study the influence that
another person of varying status has, related to the commu
nication channel and to his approach.
In conclusion therefore, this study poses more
questions, than it answers.

Like most other studies in

the area of communications, the generality of its results
are laden with restrictions associated with the specific
circumstances of the experiment.

However, it does

indicate that the communication channel and the dispo
sition of the communicator are important considerations
in research on communication.

But its deepest value lies

in flo fact that it invites further investigations on the
effect of communication channel on interpersonal interactions.
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Appendix A

Figure 1 : Prototype of the Prisoner's Dilemma Game
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Appendix B
Payoff Matrix Used in this Experiment
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Appendix C
Items in the Interpersonal Trust Scale

Hypocracy is on the increase in our society.
This country has a dark future unless we can attract hetter
people into politics.
Using the honor system of not having a teacher present during
exams would probably result in increased cheating.
The United Nations will never be an effective force in keeping
world peace.
Most people would be horrified if they knew how much news the
public hears and sees is distorted.
Even though we have reports in newspapers, radio, and TV, it is
hard to get objective accounts of public events.
If we really knew what was going on in international politics,
the public would have reason to be more frightened than they
now seem to be.
Many major national sports contests are fixed on one way or
another.
Most people can be counted on to do what they say they will do.
In dealing with strangers one is better off to be cautious
until they have provided evidence that they are trustworthy.
Eear of social disgrace or punishment rather than conscience
prevents most people from breaking the law.
Parents usually can be relied upon to keep their promises.
The judiciary is a place where we can all get unbiased treatment.
It is safe to believe that in spite of what people say most
people are primarily interested in their own welfare.
The future seems very promising.
Most elected public officials are really sincere in their
campaign promises.
Most experts can be relied upon to tell the truth about the
limits of their knowledge.
Most parents can be relied upon to carry out their threats
of punishment.
In these competitive times one has to be alert or someone is
likely to take advantage of you.
Most idealists are sincere and usually practice what they preach.
Most salesmen are honest in describing their products.
Most students in school would not cheat even if they were
sure of getting away with it.
Most repairmen will not overcharge even if they think you are
ignorant of their specialty.
Most people answer public opinion polls honestly.
A large share of accident claims filed against insurance companies
are phony.
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Appendix D

Items of "Other Person" Semantic Differential Rating Scale
assuring
pleasant
unpersuasive
inexperienced
credible
submissive
unselfish
unfriendly
strong
active
expert
altruistic
bad
subdued
trustworthy
biased
clever
incompetent
controlling
unfair
dull
competitive
meek
unskillful
admirable

unassuring
unpleasant
persuasive
experienced
suspicious
domineering
selfish
friendly
weak
passive
ignorant
egotistic
good
dynamic
tricky
objective
stupid
competent
unconstraining
fair
shrewd
cooperative
aggressive
skillful
contemptible

Items of "Experiment" Semantic Differential Rating Scale
good
honest
tiring
useful
fake
worthless
deceitful
interesting
unreal
well executed

bad
dishonest
engrossing
useless
authentic
valuable
genuine
boring
real
poorly executed
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Appendix D (continued)

Items of "Message" Semantic Differential Rating Scale
Partner* s Intention
communicated
not communicated
clear
unclear
Partner* s Expectation of You
communicated
not communicated
clear
unclear
Partner* s Intention whenever
You Play Red
play red
play "black
communicated
not communicated
clear
unclear
Partner* s Intention whenever
You Play Black "After Having
Played Red
play red
play "black
communicated
not communicated
clear
unclear
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Appendix E

Instructions to Subjects
You are about to participate in an experiment designed
to study social interaction between two people. In front of
you is a large letter. A, which, identifies you as person A.
Please remember your letter because you will need to laiow this
as the experiment progresses.
In this experiment, you will be interacting with
another person stationed in the next room. This is person B.
This person, like you, is a volunteer from the introductory
psychology class at the University of Windsor. She is receiv
ing at this moment the same taped instructions as you.
With person B, you will be performing a task that
has certain outcomes. The outcome will depend on what you
as well as person B do.
In front of you on the desk is a matrix. Person B
has the same matrix as you have. As you can see, this matrix
is made up of four cells. Each cell contains possible outcomes
for you and for person B. Take a moment to examine the matrix
(pause). In this experiment, you will be required to make a
choice between two rows that have been labelled " I choose";
that is, you choose between the rows identified by either a
solid black circle or a solid red circle. Similarly, person B
will make a choice between the two columns which have been
labelled "Other chooses"; that is, person B will choose either
the striped black circle or the striped red circle. In order
to communicate your choice to me, you will place the block that
you have in front of you in the appropriate solid colored circle.
For example, to show me that you choose black, you place your
block on the solid black circle; if you wish to choose red,
place your block on the solid red circle. Please note that you
place your block on either of the solid colored circles labelled
"I choose". Person B will place her block on either of the
striped colored circles labelled "Other Chooses".
Your outcome is determined by the row and column
choices made by you and the other person. That is, your outcome
will be delivered by the cell which the row choice and the column
choice share. For example, suppose you chose black and person
B chose black. The place where these choices overlap is in the
upper left-hand cell; "I get 3^, other gets 3^"; therefore,
you both get three cents. If your choice were black, but
person B were to choose red instead this time, then you would
be getting the outcomes from the upper right-hand cell; "I get
04 , other gets 5^"; therefore, you would get nothing and
person B would get five cents. If you chose red this time and
person B chose black, your outcome would be found in the lower
left-hand cell; "I get 5^, other gets 0^"; therefore, you would
get five cents and person B would get nothing. If you chose red
and person B chose red also, then the outcome would be obtained
from the l o w e r right-hand cell: "I get 1^, other gets 1^".
Note that the bM-ck-red color coding on the matrix
has been designed to help you pin-point the outcome of each
trial. That is, if you and person B both choose black, your
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Appendix E (continued)

outcome is delivered by the upper left-hand cell which is
completely bound by a black border and in which both your outcome
and Person B's outcome are written in black. On the other
hand, if you and person B both choose red, the lower right-hand
cell provides your outcome: note here that the border of this
cell is completely red and both your outcome and person B's
outcome are written in red. If, however, one of you chooses
black and the other red, the outcomes will be obtained from
either the upper right-hand cell or the lower left-hand cell;
both cells are bound by black and red borders and one person's
outcome is written in black and the other person's outcome
is written in red.
Do not worry if you are not sure about how the matrix
works. I will be in shortly to clear up any misunderstandings.
In the course of the experiment, you will get a
chance to make a series of separate choices, I will tell you
when each decision period begins. After you have each made
your choice, I will inform you of your gains and ask you to remove
your block in preparation for the next trial. Over successive
trials, I will add up your total gains so that you will know
exactly what your total is as the experiment progresses (at
this point, tne experimenter enters the experimental room to
make sure that the subject understands the game).
In this experiment, you will be able to earn money:
that is, you get to keep all the money you accumulate in the
course of the experiment. You will receive payment immedialely
after this experiment. Therefore, you and person B stand a
chance of earning money today, but how much you gain will
depend on what you do and what the other person does.
Of course, it is best for you to gain as much as you
can for yourself and lose as little as possible in the course
of the experiment. Don't worry about the other person's
earnings. Just concern yourself with what you can make.
Person B has also been instructed only to concern herself
with her own earnings.
This experiment has been designed to study the effect
of different channels of one-way communication on the behavior
of two interacting people. Specifically, some of the subjects
in this experiment will be able to communicate by means of
face-to-face communication, others by means of closed-circuit
television, others by means of the telephone and finally others
by means of written notes, (depending on the experimental
condition, the subjects received one of the following instructions)
— For your purposes, you shall be in the face-to-face
communication condition. Since this is an experiment on one
way communication, only one of you will be able to communicate
with the otiier. Person B, by virtue of a randomized process,
has been assigned the position of communicator in this experi
ment; that is, at certain predetermined points during the
experiment, I will allow her to enter your experimental room
and communicate with you, if she so desires. She will sit
down in front of you and will give you her message. You must
not communicate with her. After Person B has finished, she will
return to her own room and the experiment will continue as
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Appendix E (continued)

usual. Remember, you are not to speak to person B. She alone
is allowed to speak.
— For your purposes, you shall be in the television
communication condition. Since this is an experiment on one
way communication, only one of you will be able to communicate
with the other. Person 3, by virtue of a randomized process,
has been assigned the position of communicator in this experi
ment; that is, at certain predetermined points during the
experiment, I will allow her to communicate with you by means
of closed-circuit television, if she so desires. She will open
the closed-circuit television, and then she will appear on the
monitor in front of you and will speak to you. You will not
be able to communicate with her. After she has spoken, she will
shut the television and the experiment will continue as usual.
— For your purposes, you shall be in the telephone
communication condition. Since this is an experiment on one
way communication, only one of you will be able to communicate
with the other. Person B, by virtue of a randomized process,
has been assigned the position of communicator in this experi
ment; that is, at certain predetermined points during the expe
riment, I will allow her to communicate -with you by means of
the telephone if she so desires. She will phone you and relay
her message to you. You will not be able to communicate with
her. After she has finished, she will hang up. You also are
to hang up the telephone receiver and the experiment will
continue as usual. Remember, you cannot speak to person B.
The transmitter in your telephone has been disconnected.
Person B alone is allowed to speak.
— For your purposes, you shall be in the written
note communication condition. Since this is an experiment on
one-way communication, only one of you will be able to commu
nicate with the other. Person B, by virtue of a randomized
process, has been assigned the position of communicator in this
experiment: that is, at certain predetermined points during the
experiment, I will allow her to communicate with you by means
of written note if she so desires. She will write her note
and pass it on to me to give to you. You will not be able to
communicate with her. After you have read her message, the
experiment will continue as usual.
— For your purposes, you shall not be able to communi
cate with person B because you belong to the control group in
this study.
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Appendix F
Friendly Communications

Communication 1:
Hi I (urnur ..) I think we've been given the same instruc
tions. It would be to our best advantage if we both chose
black. I'll choose black on the next trial; I hope you will too.
If we're fair to each other, then, we'll both wjji. I'll follow
whatever you do on the experiment. If you choose black, I'll
choose black. If you choose red, I'll choose red on the next
trial. OKay? Let's go.
Communication 2:
Well, I know I've got a better idea of what the
experiment is all about. I hope you do too. It (ah...) I
guess it's best if...if I choose whatever you choose on the trial
before. If we both, choose black, then...then we'll both win, and
make some money. If you choose red, I'll choose red on the
next trial. I guess in the long run the black is our best
choice. Uhh...Let's just be fair with each other and both
choose black.
Communication 3a:
Things are going really good, Wei re both sharing in
honesty and we're making money too. Let's keep on working
great together.
Communication 3&:
Unfortunately we haven't been doing as well as we
might. But on the last trial we both chose black and we both
made some money. Let's keep on choosing black, from now on.
We should do well together from now on.
Communication 3c:
I'm sorry but we haven't been doing as well as we
might together. If only you could talk to me. Well...I'm
going to choose red on the next trial because you chose red on
the last trial. I hope you'll choose black. But let's be honest
with each other after that...and both keep on choosing black
for the rest of the game. Then we'll both win and make some
money. Okay?
Communication 3d:
It's too bad but we haven't been doing as well as we
might. If only you could talk to me. Well let's get out of
this rut and start choosing black. I'm going to choose black
on the next trial because you chose black on the...on the last
trial. This is a good point to keep on choosing black. And
then we can make some money. Okay? Let's go...
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Appendix F (continued)

Unfriendly Communications
Communication 1:
I believe w e ' v e b e e n given the same instructions...
It would be to my advantage and to your advantage if I choose
black and you choose black...Therefore...1 shall choose black
and so should you...If you choose black, I will continue to
choose black...Should you choose red, I will retaliate on the
next trial and choose red...I will make a point of making the
same choice as you did on the preceeding trial...You shall
not take advantage of my position.
Communication 2:
It is obvious that the correct choice is a black
choice...I have decided to take the same strategy as I took in
the trials before...On the next trial, I shall choose black...
I expect you to choose black...If you choose red, I will reta
liate by choosing red on the trial after...In other words, I
shall make a point of making the same choice as you made on
the trial before.
Communication 3a:
I was correct in my thinking..1 trust you will
continue to cooperate...
Communication 3b:
Unfortunately during the experiment you refused to
cooperate fully with m e ...Continue to choose black as you did
on the last trial...Then I will choose black...I hope I have
made myself clear.
Communication 3c:
Unfortunately you refused to cooperate fully with me
during the experiment...Obviously black...is the best choice
in the long run...So on the next trial choose black...I shall
choose red because you chose red on the last trial...But you
must first show that your intentions are honest and choose
black...Then 1 will choose black...I hope I have made myself
clear...
Communication 3d:
Unfortunately you refuse to cooperate with me fully.
Obviously black is the best choice in the long run...Because
you chose black on the last trial, I will choose black on the
next...Should you choose red on the next trial, I will choose
red on the trial after,..! hope I have made myself clear...
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